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INTRODUCTION
On February 7, 2007, a Pennsylvania woman videotaped her tod-
dler dancing to a portion of a song performed by Prince during the
halftime show of the Super Bowl.' Wishing family and friends to see
the video, she uploaded it to YouTube, a website that enables users to
© 2008 Sara K. Stadler. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for education
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; J.D., University of
Virginia School of Law; B.A., Emory University. I am grateful to Robert B. Ahdieh,
Michael W. Carroll, Robert C. Denicola, Michael S. Kang, Mark A. Lemley, Kay L.
Levine, and Pamela Samuelson for providing me with their comments on an earlier
draft of this Article. I also would like to thank Richard D. Freer and Robert A.
Schapiro for their support and Juhi Kaveeshvar for her excellent research assistance.
1 Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., Mom Sues Universal Music for DMCA
Abuse (July 24, 2007), available at http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2007-07.php.
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post and watch videos. 2 Four months later, the Universal Music Pub-
lishing Group (Universal) demanded that YouTube remove the video,
claiming that the video infringed its copyright in the song.3 YouTube
complied, and the video was removed from view. 4
Unfortunately, this was not an exceptional case. 5 Every day, copy-
right owners are asserting their rights to exclude performances of
copyrighted works from public view, even when those performances
pose no threat to profitability. These skirmishes are only part of a
strategy to control each and every way in which copyrighted works are
both delivered to and experienced by the public, and increasingly,
this strategy depends on the exercise of the exclusive right of public
performance (the "performance right," for short). For copyright own-
ers, this right has become a particularly powerful tool: unlike the right
to distribute a copyrighted work in copies, the performance right enti-
tes copyright owners to demand a royalty nearly every time a perform-
ance finds a new audience.
Notwithstanding these developments, the scope of the exclusive
right of public performance has excited almost no comment from
scholars in the field. Of those few who have commented, most have
proposed to broaden the right by extending it to owners of copyright in
sound recordings, 6 whose rights are limited under existing law.7
2 YouTube, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2008). Google, the
owner of the service, has said that it "hopes technology will be in place in September
[2007] to stop the posting of copyright-infringing videos on its YouTube site." For
YouTube, a System to Halt Copyright-Infringing Videos, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2007, at C6. In
the meantime, however, Viacom Inc. has sued Google for more than $1 billion, alleg-
ing "massive copyright infringement." Miguel Helft & Geraldine Fabrikant, Viacom
Sues Google over Video Clips on Its Sharing Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at Cl.
3 See Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 1.
4 Id. The video since has been reposted. See id.
5 See id. (noting that Universal recently "sent a baseless copyright takedown
demand to YouTube for a video podcast by political blogger Michelle Malkin" and
that "[the] video was quickly reposted after Malkin fought back"). What made this
case worth noting was the intervention of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which
sued Universal on July 24, 2007, for abusing its copyright under various theories of
federal and state law. Id.
6 See, e.g., Matthew S. DelNero, Long Overdue? An Exploration of the Status and
Merit of a General Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc.
181, 202 (2004); Kara M. Wolke, Some Catching Up to Do: How the United States, in Refus-
ing to Fully Sign on to the WPPT's Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, Fell Behind
the Protections of Artists' Rights Recognized Elsewhere in This Increasingly Global Music Com-
munity, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 411, 414 (2005); Jonathan S. Lawson, Note, Eight
Million Performances Later, Still Not a Dime: Why It Is Time to Comprehensively Protect Sound
Recording Public Performances, 81 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 693, 718 (2006); see also Lydia
Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 673, 713
(2003) (proposing to extend the right to owners of copyright in sound recordings
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These proposals, which make regular appearances in the literature,
tend to rest on principles of equity: why should owners of copyright in
sound recordings be denied rights that other rightsholders, here or
abroad,8 enjoy?9 Or, as David Nimmer has put it, why not "plug the
historical anomaly?"' 0 On the other side of the conversation, Mark
Lemley has proposed to narrow the performance right (among other
rights) by replacing it with "a new exclusive right of transmission over
a computer network."" Unfortunately, this approach is both too nar-
row and too broad-too narrow because it addresses only "Net trans-
missions" of performances, 12 and too broad because it gives copyright
owners the right to control transmissions even when the costs of con-
trol exceed its benefits.' 3
This scarcity of solutions to the problem of performance is sur-
prising, for the right is an interesting one, often to the point of being
strange. One interesting thing about the performance right, at least
in terms of semantics, is that it does not protect performers or their
only as part of a broader solution to the problems posed by copyright law as it applies
to music).
7 See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
8 See Wolke, supra note 6, at 411-12 (describing the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms Treaty which, in Article 15(1),
"recognizes a right to remuneration for performers and producers from public per-
formances of their sound recordings").
9 But see Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J.
433, 440-47 (2007) (describing how creators "have justified their demands for
broader rights . . .by pointing to the rights that others enjoy and by demanding to
enjoy rights 'as good,"' to the ultimate detriment of the public).
10 David Nimmer, Ignoring the Public, Part I: On the Absurd Complexity of the Digital
Audio Transmission Right, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189, 192 (2000) (arguing that "[w]hen
Congress decided to plug the historical anomaly under which sound recordings
lacked any performance right, it could have acted very simply" by "add[ing] a general
right of public performance in sound recordings to the preexisting rights in the Copy-
right Act").
11 Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 547, 582 (1997). On the subject of transmissions, and taking an even nar-
rower approach, David Lilenfeld has proposed to limit the performance right to "pri-
mary transmissions," thus enabling business owners to "furnish their establishments
with radio or televisions and tune into programming" without engaging in copyright
infringement. See David M. Lilenfeld, Note, Why Congress Should Eliminate the Multiple
Performance Doctrine, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 695, 727 (1997).
12 Lemley, supra note 11, at 582-84.
13 Recognizing these costs, Lemley has acknowledged that a network transmission
right "would have to be accompanied by a package of amendments to §§ 107-120 [of
Title 17] designed to apply certain of those existing user rights," but he has not
described those amendments, instead leaving them to Congress to craft "on a case-by-
case basis." Id. at 583.
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performances.' 4 Instead, when Congress granted owners of copyright
in qualifying works the exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted
work publicly,"' 5 Congress created property rights in precursors to per-
formance such as plays, songs, and more recently, choreography. 16
This grant of rights gives copyright owners the ability to condition
public performances of their works on the payment of royalties, thus
subjecting performers to demands for payment.1 7 A century ago, cop-
yright owners made relatively few such demands, 18 believing that the
performance right was largely incidental to other, more lucrative
rights like the exclusive rights of "printing, reprinting, publishing, and
vending" copies of their works. 19 As technology has changed, how-
ever, so have the ways in which people experience copyrighted works,
and as a result, the performance right has changed, too.
Congress appears to have created the performance right with
"the paradigm image of a public performance" in mind: "an actor
seen and heard by an audience assembled in his immediate pres-
ence." 20 These days, however, performances are as likely to occur in
the ether as they are on the stage, as Congress has defined "perform-
ance" broadly enough to cover transmissions of data. 21 Nor do per-
formances need to be particularly "public" anymore, at least in the
usual sense: a private club can engage in a public performance simply
by inviting too many people to see or hear the performance of a copy-
righted work.22 In fact, the reach of the performance right has
become so broad that it now gives copyright owners the ability to
charge for access to their works-not once, as with the sale of cop-
ies,23 but at "each step in the process by which a protected work wends
14 For copyright scholars, this characteristic of the performance right likely is so
familiar as to be entirely uninteresting.
15 Copyright Act of 1976 § 106(4), 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
16 See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
17 Id.
18 See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
19 See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (extending the grant to
owners of copyright in musical works); Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124,
124 (extending the grant to owners of copyright in books, charts, and maps).
20 United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 876 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968), superseded by statute Copyright Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "perform").
22 See id. (defining "publicly"); infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
23 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) (limiting "the provisions of section 106(3)" to pro-
vide that "the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this
title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord").
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its way to its audience." 24 Taken together, these changes in the law
are revealing of the strangest thing about the exclusive right of public
performance: it is not really about performances at all. Instead, copy-
right owners are using the right as a Trojan Horse to defeat longstand-
ing limitations on the core right in copyright law25 : the right to
distribute a work in copies (that is, to "publish" it).26 And because
those limitations are an integral part of the copyright balance, 27 the
resulting benefit to copyright owners comes at the expense of the
public.
In Part I of this Article, I analyze the exclusive right of public
performance, along with its history, by highlighting a few of the stran-
ger things about the right. In Part II, I examine the public interest in
regulating performance, weighing the costs of the performance right
against its benefits. I begin this exercise by detailing how the perform-
ance right under existing law leads to a multiplicity of claims on the
public which, in turn, imposes significant costs on society. Those costs
include not only the cost of complying with the right (including royal-
ties and "clearance" 28), but also the cost of enabling copyright owners
to provide the public with ephemeral "experiences" 2 9 instead of tangi-
24 David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
25 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 500-01 (2001) (describing how the
"reproduction and distribution of individual Articles... would invade the core of the
Authors' exclusive rights under § 106 [of Title 17]").
26 "Publication," in copyright terms, occurs when a copyright owner makes her
work "available to members of the public regardless of who they are or what they will
do with it." Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc.,
944 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Burke v. NBC, Inc., 598 F.2d 688, 691 (1st
Cir. 1979)). There is a significant amount of overlap between publication and public
"distribution," to which copyright owners have the exclusive right under § 106(3). See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "publication"); Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (observing that § 106(3) "recognized
for the first time a distinct statutory right of first publication, which had previously
been an element of the common-law protections afforded unpublished works").
27 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(instructing that the limited scope of copyright "reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availa-
bility of literature, music, and the other arts").
28 For an excellent description of copyright clearance, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 249-52 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
29 Jane Ginsburg has argued that copyright law should accommodate the desire
of copyright owners to charge for copyright "experiences." See generallyJane C. Gins-
burg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in US.
Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v U.S.A. 113, 119-25 (2003) (arguing that copy-
right holders should be construed to have "access" rights rather than "copy" rights).
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ble copies. Against these costs, I weigh the benefits of the existing
right, finding those benefits to be surprisingly few. Finally, in Part III,
I use these insights to redefine the right, first by changing its benefi-
ciaries and second by changing its boundaries, in each case describing
a right that is considerably more narrow than the one that exists
today. The first proposal withholds the performance right entirely
from most owners of copyright, thereby sacrificing breadth for clarity.
The second proposal defines the right more broadly by extending a
more limited right to more beneficiaries, but because those limita-
tions might be susceptible of varying interpretations, the second pro-
posal sacrifices clarity for breadth. Both proposals, however, would
encourage rightsholders not only to perform their works, but also to
distribute those works to the public in tangible form-thus requiring
rightsholders to embrace the proliferation of physical copies on which
the preservation of culture depends.
I. THREE STRANGE THINGS ABOUT THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT
A. It Doesn't Protect Performers
Section 106(4) of the Copyright Act provides owners of copyright
in "literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works" with the exclusive
right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly."30 The beneficiaries
of this right are not performers or, strictly speaking, their perform-
ances. Instead, the exclusive right of public performance protects
those who have ownership interests in the precursors to performance,
such as songs3 I and plays. 32 Anyone who performs such a copyrighted
work without permission-that is, anyone who "recite[s], render[s],
play [s], dance [s], or act Is] it, either directly or by means of any device
or process"3 3-engages in prima facie infringement of copyright.
3 4
For copyright scholars, these are perfectly ordinary facts. The right
simply is one way in which the law grants an entitlement to creators in
return for creating valuable works-in this case, because those works
are performable.
30 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
31 See id. § 102(a) (2) (2000) (extending copyright to "musical works").
32 See id. § 102(a) (3) (extending copyright to "dramatic works").
33 See id. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (providing that to "'perform' a work means to
recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or
process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its
images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible").
34 See id. §§ 106(4), 501(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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The performance right has a predictable impact on performers: if
a performer wishes to perform any part of a copyrighted work, the law
requires him to pay its owner for a license (or risk a lawsuit). In other
words, the law imposes costs on performers for the benefit of those
who own copyright in the raw materials of performances. Any bene-
fits to performers are few, at least under copyright law, for even a per-
former who engages in a licensed performance may not enjoy much
of a copyright in the result.35 On the one hand, if a performer ren-
ders a copyrighted work so faithfully as to create a "copy" of it,36 then
the performance is copyrightably indistinct from the underlying work,
which means that the performance does not qualify for its own copy-
right. 37 On the other hand, if the performer adds something "origi-
nal" 38 to the underlying work, then he has created an adaptation, or
what the law terms a "derivative work. '39 Copyright in such a deriva-
tive does not extend to the underlying work, but "extends only to the
35 If a performer does not take a license, he enjoys no copyright in his perform-
ance at all. See id. § 103(a) (providing that "protection for a work employing preexist-
ing material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in
which such material has been used unlawfully").
36 See id. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "copies" as "material objects... in which
a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device").
37 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONG., CIRCULAR No. 14, COPYRIGHT REGIS-
TRATION FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS 1 (2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
circs/circl4.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008) ("To be copyrightable, a derivative work
must be different enough from the original to be regarded as a 'new work' . . . .
Making minor changes or additions of little substance to a preexisting work will not
qualify the work as a new version for copyright purposes.").
38 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (providing that "[c]opyright protection sub-
sists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression");
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884) (defining an
"author" as "'he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who com-
pletes a work of science or literature"' (quotingJOSEPH E. WORCESTER, A DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 99 (1879))).
39 The Copyright Act defines "derivative work" as
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture ver-
sion, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifi-
cations which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005); see supra note 37.
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material contributed by [its] author"40 -i.e., the performer-assum-
ing, of course, that the terms of the license permit the performer to
retain even this (thin) copyright.41 Clearly, something other than
copyright is motivating these performers to perform.
But the law need not be so hostile to performers, and indeed, it
was not always so hostile as it is today. Before 1856, copyright owners
did not enjoy a performance right at all, but enjoyed only publication
rights, that is, the exclusive rights of "printing, reprinting, publishing,
and vending" copies of their works. 42 Only in 1856, when Congress
expressly extended the statutory copyright to "dramatic composi-
tions," did it also create the performance right, granting owners of
plays the exclusive right to "act, perform, or represent the same, or
cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or public
place for the whole period for which the copyright is obtained." 43
This right may not have been particularly useful at the time. "Publica-
tion" (in print) was a prerequisite to protection under the statute, 44
and as Congress later noted, the dramatist "does not usually publish
his work in the ordinary acceptation of the term."45 This fact may
have led Congress to introduce a bill on March 24, 1870 that sought to
provide statutory protection to proprietors of dramatic works
"designed and suitable for public performance or representation only,
and not for publication."46 The bill did not pass, perhaps because
Senator Morrill opined that if the works at issue were "too . . . frivo-
lous to be published in the ordinary mode, they can scarcely be wor-
40 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000) (emphasis added); see id. (providing, further, that
the copyright in the derivative work "does not imply any exclusive right in the preex-
isting material").
41 Cf Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(describing a "thin" copyright in a case involving a factual compilation).
42 See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436; Copyright Act of 1790, ch.
15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
43 Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139. Congress had tried to create
such a right as early as 1841, when the Senate reported a bill (S. 227) that would have
given authors and translators of "dramatic entertainment" the sole right of "represent-
ing" their works "at any place of public amusement within the United States" for a
period of fourteen years. S. 227, 26th Cong. (2d Sess. 1841).
44 See Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 138-39 (extending rights to
owners of dramatic compositions in which "copyright hereafter [is] granted under
the laws of the United States").
45 H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 4 (1909); see also Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977, 981
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1691) (holding that the mere performance of a work did
not constitute "publication"); Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180, 185 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1861) (No. 7644) (observing that "[t] he intended meaning of the word 'publication,'
in this and other statutory provisions concerning copyright, is publication in print").
46 S. 703, 41st Cong. (2d Sess. 1870).
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thy of the extraordinary legislation proposed." 47  Even so, the
performance right was of theoretical benefit, at least, to those play-
wrights who distributed copies of their works to the public.
What of songwriters, those primary beneficiaries of the perform-
ance right today? In granting the right to dramatists in 1856, Con-
gress neglected to do the same for owners of copyright in musical
compositions, who continued to enjoy only "the sole right of printing,
copying, etc., and not of public representation." 48 For at least one
court, this inequity was "much to be regretted,"49 and Congress finally
granted the performance right to proprietors of both "dramatic [and]
musical compositions" in 1897.50 Congress went on to limit the rights
of songwriters, in 1909, to public performances "for profit," even as it
added to the list of works that qualified for the performance right.51
By 1976, though, Congress had thought better of the "for profit" limi-
tation, 52 choosing instead to enact narrower (and lengthier) excep-
tions to a broad performance right that now includes among its
beneficiaries the owners of copyright in "literary, musical, dramatic,
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works. '53
This history of expansion is a familiar story to students of copy-
right law. Over time, an increase in rights creates expectations of
increasing reward among creators, whose demands, in turn, stimulate
the grant of yet more rights. 54 When it comes to the performance right,
however, the story raises a more interesting question: why create such
a right in the first place? To be sure, England had one before the
47 S. REP. No. 41-209, at 1 (1870) (recommending, accordingly, that the bill
"do[es] not pass").
48 Carte v. Duff, 25 F. 183, 187 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885).
49 Id.
50 See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481, 481-82.
51 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1 (e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075, repealed by Copy-
right Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
52 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62-63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5676 (noting that it was "more reasonable" to omit the "for profit" limitation
not only because "[m]any 'non-profit' organizations are highly subsidized and capa-
ble of paying royalties," but also because "performances ... are continuing to sup-
plant markets for printed copies and . . . in the future a broad 'not for profit'
exemption could not only hurt authors but could dry up their incentive to write").
53 See id. (reporting that "[t]he approach of the bill, as in many foreign laws, is
first to state the public performance right in broad terms, and then to provide specific
exemptions for educational and other nonprofit uses"). The right is found in 17
U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); the exceptions to it are found in 17 U.S.C.A.
§§ 110, 111, 114(d), 116, 118, 119, 122 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
54 See Stadler, supra note 9, at 456-59.
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United States did,55 but in 1856, at least, American law did not, "like
the English statutes, protect the... proprietor in all the uses to which
literary property may be legitimately applied."56 And while it may be
true that some works-like plays and songs-were made to be per-
formed, there were other ways for playwrights and songwriters to
make money in 1856. Playwrights sold copies of their plays to produc-
ers and directors who wished to stage performances. Songwriters sold
copies of their songs (known as "sheet music"), not only to orchestras
and singers, but also to millions of ordinary Americans.
In this world, in which recording devices did not exist, there were
only two ways to perform a copyrighted play or song without having a
copy in hand: (1) to perform the work from memory; and (2) to
record a performance by hand, that is, by taking notes. While courts
tended to punish the stenographers in the second category,57 at least
one court was sympathetic to the prodigious memorizers in the first
category. In Keene v. Wheatley,58 the court instructed that the owner of
copyright in an unpublished play59 cannot, having performed it
"before an indiscriminate audience, maintain an objection to any
such literary or dramatic republication by others as they may be ena-
bled.., to make from its having been retained in the memory of any
of the audience. '60 That is, "the privileges of listening and of reten-
tion in the memory cannot be restrained. '61 Later courts, however,
rejected these "privileges," holding that copying for the purpose of
later "representation" was unlawful-" [i] n whatever mode the copy is
obtained." 62 For the court in Tompkins v. Halleck,63 "[t]he ticket of
admission is a license to witness the play, but it cannot be treated as a
55 See Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 432 (1912) (noting that section 20 of the
British Copyright Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45, conferred to playwrights the right to
represent their dramatic works).
56 Carte v. Duff, 25 F. 183, 187 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885).
57 See, e.g., Keene v. Wheadey, 14 F. Cas. 180, 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7644)
(observing that "the manager of a theatre may prevent a reporter from noting the
words of such a play phonographically or stenographically or otherwise").
58 14 F. Cas. 180.
59 Under the law at the time, the mere performance of a work did not constitute
"publication." See Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977, 981 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No.
1691). Unpublished works were protected under the common law of copyright. See
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834) ("That an author, at common law,
has a property in his manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who
deprives him of it, or by improperly obtaining a copy endeavours to realise a profit by
its publication, cannot be doubted...
60 Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 201.
61 Id.
62 Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32, 42, 46 (1882).
63 133 Mass. 32.
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license to the spectator to represent the drama if he can by memory
recollect it."64 The license to experience a performance is not a
license to copy it.
These cases help to make an important point about the perform-
ance right: notwithstanding the existence of the right, the possession
of a copy was, and continues to be, critical to the enterprise of per-
formance. Most copyrighted works are not capable of being per-
formed without a copy of the work in hand.65 Copyright owners once
understood this, and in the early days of the performance right, they
tended to invoke the right only when the defendant had failed to
purchase a copy of the work he went on to perform. 66 So long as
people were buying copies of their plays or songs, copyright owners
64 Id. at 46.
65 There are obvious exceptions, such as songs that even the forgetful could per-
form from memory. One such song is "Happy Birthday to You," in which copyright is
claimed, although the online encyclopedia Wikipedia relates several theories under
which the work might have fallen into the public domain decades ago. SeeWikipedia,
Happy Birthday to You, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Happy-Birthday-toYou (last
visited Jan. 28, 2008).
66 See Argument on H.R. 11943, To Amend Title 60, Chapter 3, of Revised Statutes of the
United States, Relating to Copyrights: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong. 7
(1906) [hereinafter Arguments on H.R. 11943] (statement of J.L. Tindale) (testifying
that "[n]o [music] publisher has ever objected" to those who perform works from
purchased copies, adding, "[wie object to their renting it to others"); id. at 11 (state-
ment of Tindale) (stating that "no publisher within my knowledge requires a pur-
chaser of copies ... to keep on buying fresh copies for any future performance he
may wish to give," but that "he is free to give any number of performances from the
copies once purchased"); id. at 14 (statement of Tindale) (testifying that "we do part
with the title to the physical copies.., and we also throw in the right of performance
to the purchaser"); see also Arguments (Cont'd) on H.R. 11943, To Amend Title 60, Chapter
3, of the Revised Statutes of the United States, Relating to Copyrights: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong. 8-9 (1906) [hereinafter Arguments (Cont'd) on H.R.
11943] (statement of A.R. Serven) (adding that "we have never brought any suit at
all").
The fact that music publishers admitted to having "slept on [their] rights" under
the statute, Arguments on H.R. 11943, supra, at 15 (statement of Tindale), did raise
issues of reliance. As Herman Froemne informed a House Committee in 1906:
A copy of each score was bought for the past fifteen years by Mr. Tams. The
publishers knew he was renting it out. It has only been a few months ago
they wanted to make a stop of it .... [W]e have bought thousands of books,
and these music publishers have received from Mr. Tams from $3,000 to
$4,000 a year for the past fifteen years. Where is the justice now, when he
has his place stocked up, in preventing him from making any profit on it?
Arguments (Cont'd) on H.R. 11943, supra, at 14 (statement of Herman Froemne); see
also Arguments on H.R. 11943, supra, at 11 (statement of Arthur W. Tams) (respond-
ing, "[t]hey permitted me to do it going on twenty years" when asked whether he
acquired the right to rent purchased copies of works for public performance).
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were happy to ignore the resulting performances. It was, in practice if
not in law, as if the purchase of a copy included an implied license to
perform the work.67 Performers were not targets of the new perform-
ance right except to the extent they failed to respect the existing
rights to "print[ ], reprint[ ], publish[ ], and vend[ ].,,68 As a result,
the performance right was unnecessary as a reward for most copyright
owners, who already enjoyed the right to publish copies of their
works-along with the right to charge a compensatory sum for those
copies. Copies were the raw materials of performance.
Shortly before the turn of the twentieth century, however,
advances in technology began to change the relationship between
copyright owners and performers. By 1890, the pioneers among the
phonograph companies had made their "talking machines" available
for purchase, and by 1897, player pianos had hit the market, too.
69
Demand skyrocketed, and soon companies were manufacturing and
distributing thousands of recordings, mostly songs, on phonograph
records and perforated rolls of paper ("piano rolls").70 These record-
67 This license was specific to the purchaser.
Mr. GILL. Do I understand you to say that in the sale of these publications
by the publishers the right of performance goes with the sale of the book?
Mr. SERVEN. To the purchaser.
The CHAIRMAN. To the original purchaser only?
Mr. TINDALE. To the original purchaser; and he can not pass that on to
another.
Mr. BONYNGE. But the original purchaser can perform it as often as he
pleases?
Mr. TINDALE. We are delighted to have him do so.
Mr. SULZER. As I understand it, the only distinction is this, that the pur-
chaser can not transfer his rights.
Mr. TINDALE. He can not give the right of performance, because he never
had the right of performance except as we gave it to him.
Arguments on H.t 11943, supra note 66, at 13 (statement of J.L. Tindale); see supra
note 66 and accompanying text; infra notes 168-71, 229 and accompanying text.
68 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124, amended by Act of Feb. 3,
1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436.
69 Thomas Edison devised a functioning type of phonograph in 1877, but it was
not until 1890 that the "first commercial [phonograph] recordings went on the mar-
ket." WILLIAM HOWLAND KENNEY, RECORDED MUSIC IN AMERICAN LIFE xii, 23 (1999).
Shortly thereafter, phonograph companies devised the idea of creating "phonograph
parlors" where people could purchase the option of playing more than one song. Id.
at 26. The player piano hit the market in 1897, although there is a dispute as to who
made the first device. See CRAIG H. ROELL, THE PIANO IN AMERICA, 1890-1940, at
39-40 (1989).
70 See ROELL, supra note 69, at 60 (stating that by 1904, the Aeolian company had
invested some $10 million in the production of perforated rolls, comprising 12,978
recorded compostions).
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ings were mostly unauthorized-not because manufacturing compa-
nies had decided to ignore the law, but because they believed that the
law did not apply. 71 To their way of thinking, they were not "publicly
performing or representing" a copyrighted work;72 they simply were
enabling consumers to perform those works in the privacy of their
own homes. Nor, to their minds, were they vending "copies" of copy-
righted works; they simply were vending pieces of etched zinc or
paper that, when inserted into a patented device, were capable of pro-
ducing music. The Supreme Court itself credited this argument in
1908, when it held that piano rolls were not "copies," and therefore
not infringing, because they were not "in intelligible notation"-that
is, they did not exist in a "form which others can see and read. ' 73 For
the first time, technology (together with the law) had enabled the
populace to enjoy performances of copyrighted works without
purchasing authorized, "intelligible" copies. To copyright owners,
performances had come to seem like piracy.
Copyright owners were quick to complain to Congress,74 and
Congress was quick to respond. In section 1 (d) of the Copyright Act
of 1909, Congress gave owners of copyright in dramatic works the
exclusive right not only to "perform or represent the copyrighted
work publicly," but also to "vend any manuscript or any record whatso-
ever thereof' and to make any such record "from which . . it may in
any manner or by any method be exhibited, performed, represented,
71 See id. at 59 ("[T]hese manufacturers [of perforated rolls and discs] were not
required by law to pay royalties to composers upon the sale of a recording. Manufac-
turers, music publishers, and even many composers viewed the mechanical reproduc-
tion of copyrighted music as an aid to sales, a form of advertising").
72 See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481, 481-82.
73 White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908). As to the
performance right, the Court noted, "There is no complaint in this case of the public
performance of copyrighted music; nor is the question involved whether the manufac-
turers of such perforated music rolls when sold for use in public performance might
be held as contributing infringers." Id. at 16.
74 Typical of the arguments made before Congress is this one by composer John
Philip Sousa in 1906: "These talking machines are going to ruin the artistic develop-
ment of music in this country." Arguments on the Bills S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, To
Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearing Before the S. Comm. and H.
Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong. 24 (1906) [hereinafter Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R.
19853] (statement ofJohn Philip Sousa); see also Copyrights: Hearings on H.R. 6250 and
H.R. 9137 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. 110 (1924) (statement of Gene
Buck, President, American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers) ("That
[player] piano was one of the most treacherous parts of mechanical reproduction,
and radio in this country, gentlemen. It is destroying the initiative in the youth of this
country to contribute to music .... ").
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produced, or reproduced. '75 Similarly, section 1 (e) provided owners
of copyright in musical works with the exclusive right not only to "per-
form their work publicly" ("for profit") 76 but also to "make any
arrangement... of it in any system of notation or any form of record
in which the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it
may be read or reproduced."77 For songwriters, however, the right
had its limits: fearing a monopoly in the market for mechanical repro-
ductions of musical works, Congress required songwriters (and their
assigns) to submit to a compulsory license of "two cents on each such
part [i.e., record or piano roll] manufactured. ' 78 The manufacturing
companies could continue to sell what had become "copies" of copy-
righted works, but now they had to pay. Copyright owners had
regained the right to control (or at least to profit from) the distribu-
tion of copies of their works.
Still, something had changed. Although the episode had begun
with manufacturers, not performers, reaping where they had not
sown, 79 copyright owners now seemed more inclined to view perform-
ers as pirates than as potential customers. The law gave copyright
owners the tool they needed to demand payment. The problem was
one of enforcement: even the most successful songwriter lacked the
resources to investigate whether third parties were engaging in public
performances of his works. The answer, of course, was for songwriters
to band together. On February 13, 1914, a group of musicians met at
the Hotel Claridge in New York City to found the American Society of
75 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(d), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075, repealed by Copy-
right Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
76 Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e); see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
77 Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e).
78 See id. § 1 (e); see also H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 6 (1909) ("How to protect [the
composer] in these rights without establishing a great music monopoly was the practi-
cal question the committee had to deal with. The only way... was, after giving the
composer the exclusive right to prohibit the use of his music by the mechanical repro-
ducers, to provide that if he used or permitted the use of his music for such purpose
then, upon the payment of a reasonable royalty, all who desired might reproduce the
music.").
79 See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) ("It may
be true that the use of these perforated rolls, in the absence of statutory protection,
enables the manufacturers thereof to enjoy the use of musical compositions for which
they pay no value. But such considerations properly address themselves to the legisla-
tive ... branch of the Government."); cf. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215, 239 (1918) (recounting, famously, that in "taking material that has been
acquired by complainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor,
skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant for money, [the] defendant in
appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not
sown").
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Composers, Authors and Publishers.80  The Society (known as
"ASCAP") describes this "monumental event" as one that "would for-
ever change music history"8 -and indeed it did. The Society took as
its "primary purpose" the enforcement of the public performance
right,8 2 a purpose it accomplished by sending investigators through-
out the United States to determine whether local playhouses and
shops were playing songs within hearing of the public without paying
for a license.8 3 When the Society found such a target, it brought suit
and increasingly, it won. 84 In practice, as in law, unlicensed public
performances had become infringements of copyright-regardless of
whether someone behind the performance had purchased a licensed
copy of the work.8 5 And copyright owners were no longer content to
ignore those infringements.
80 See History of ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about/history/ (last visited Jan.
28, 2008).
81 Id.
82 Id. The Society also lobbied Congress for greater rights for its members, most
memorably through its counsel, Nathan Burkan. Burkan was a zealous advocate.
Consider this exchange between Burkan and Representative Reid, in 1925:
Mr. REID. Could you have made this thing with any more selfish slant in
your interest?
Mr. BURKAN. I certainly could. But we accept it without the slightest criti-
cism, because [the bill] possesses that absolutely equality and fairness to all
affected thereby, so essential for any measure intended to protect the crea-
tor of literary property against despoliation and to secure to him the full
fruits of his literary efforts.
Copyrights: Hearings on H.k 11258 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. 148
(1925) (statement of Nathan Burkan). Burkan tried to persuade Congress to repeal
the compulsory license of musical works-known as the "mechanical license"-but he
did not succeed. Id. He was, however, very successful in persuading Congress to
increase the rights of songwriters in particular and copyright owners in general.
83 See, e.g., Buck v. Robinson, 42 F. Supp. 697, 697 (S.D. W.Va. 1942).
84 In the early years of the Society, it filed few lawsuits, and some courts, at least,
were suspicious of its methods. See, e.g., id. at 698 (noting that "[t]he evidence shows
that the memory of plaintiffs' two investigators was not so good as to some matters
that occurred [at the Shady Rest] that night" and holding that "the plaintiffs have
failed to prove the performance of the composition by a preponderance of the evi-
dence"). No longer. See Kristi Heim, Music Suit Creates Discord, SEA-rLE TIMES, Aug. 1,
2007, at Cl (noting that the Society recently had filed twenty-six lawsuits against estab-
lishments in seventeen states, and stating that "[w] hile many business owners may not
be aware of it, such legal action is becoming common").
85 See Interstate Hotel Co. v. Remick Music Corp., 157 F.2d 744, 745 (8th Cir.
1946) ("The right to publish and sell copies of the copyrighted musical work and the
right publicly to perform the work for profit are separate and distinct rights separately
granted by the Copyright Act .... There is nothing in the Act which makes the exer-
cise of one right dependent upon the abandonment of the other. The copyright
owner may exercise either right or both as its interest may dictate.").
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Thus does the performance right today exist to protect the own-
ers of copyright in "literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works"8 6 from the predations of performers. This is not to say that the
copyright statute leaves performers entirely out in the cold. Those
who perform musical or literary works (or, more likely, their publish-
ers) enjoy certain exclusive rights in their recorded performances-
known as "sound recordings." 87 Ironically, however, the performance
right is not among those rights;88 for the most part, owners of copy-
right in sound recordings cannot deny others the right to perform
those works in public.89 Instead, born of the "widespread unautho-
rized reproduction of phonograph records and tapes,"90 the sound
recording copyright is a publication right, giving its owners the exclu-
sive right to reproduce and distribute the work in copies.9' And even
those rights are limited. First, copyright owners have a remedy against
only those defendants who distribute copies that "directly or indirectly
recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording"-which means
that others are perfectly free to simulate a copyrighted performance,
so long as they engage in an "independent fixation" of sound.9 2 Sec-
ond, because "protection for a work ... does not extend to any part of
the work in which [copyrighted] material has been used unlawfully, 93
the very existence of copyright in a sound recording depends on
whether the performer secured a license to perform the underlying
copyrighted work. That is, the mere possibility of qualifying for a cop-
yright herself does not free a performer from the obligation to satisfy
the beneficiaries of the performance right.
86 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
87 Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines "sound recordings" as "works that
result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not includ-
ing the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless
of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in
which they are embodied." Id. § 101 (Supp. V 2005).
88 See id. § 114(a) (2000) (providing that "It]he exclusive rights of the owner of
copyright in a sound recording.., do not include any right of performance under
section 106(4)").
89 Owners of copyrights in sound recordings do enjoy the exclusive right to "per-
form the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission," i.e., via
Internet or satellite radio. See id. § 106(6); infra Part III.C.
90 H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567.
91 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2000 & Supp IV. 2004). Owners of copyright in
sound recordings also enjoy the exclusive right to "prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work." Id. § 106(2).
92 Id. § 114(b); see also id. (placing the same limitation on the adaptation right in
§ 106(2)).
93 See id. § 103(a).
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Interestingly enough, the law that seems best designed to protect
performers is not a copyright law at all, but a misappropriation statute
known as the "anti-bootlegging" section of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act.94 The statute, which Congress enacted solely to satisfy its
treaty obligations,95 prohibits third parties from: (1) "fix[ing] the...
sounds and images of a live musical performance in a copy or pho-
norecord" without permission; (2) making further copies of it; and
(3) "distribut[ing] or offer[ing] to distribute" those copies.96 The tort
does not qualify as copyright infringement because copyright law ref-
uses to protect things, like live performances, that do not exist in tan-
gible ("fixed") form.97 As a result, the right described by the statute is
known as a "neighboring right"-one that resides just outside the
boundaries of copyright.98 The right has a great deal in common with
another neighboring right, the European conception of "le droit
moral," under which artists have the privilege of deciding when and
how to release their works to the public. 99 It also may be the form of
protection that most performers really want-that is, the ability to say
when their works are made tangible, and by whom. Unfortunately,
the right is available only to those who engage in "live musical per-
formance[s]";100 other performers need not apply. It also is valuable
to performers only until their performances are fixed. Once a per-
formance is fixed ("by . . . authority of the author"),101 it becomes
copyrightable, and in the music business, at least, those who reap the
greatest benefits from copyright are not performers, but their produc-
ers and publishers.'02
B. It's Not Limited to Public Conduct
The performance right does have its limits. Unlike some of the
rights enumerated in § 106, the performance right is expressly limited
94 Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 512, 108 Stat. 4809, 4974 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C.A. § 1101 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007)).
95 See H.R. REP. No. 103-826(I) (1995), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773
(reporting that "Title V Implements the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights").
96 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000).
97 See id. § 102(a) (providing that "[c]opyright protection subsists ... in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression").
98 See 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8E.01 [B],
at 8E-5 (2006).
99 See id. § 8D.01 [A], at 8D-3 to -6.
100 See 17 U.S.C. § I101 (a).
101 See id. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "fixed").
102 See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
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to public acts, placing private performances beyond the reach of the
statute.103 But what constitutes a public act? Despite evidence that
Congress originally intended to prohibit only those performances "in
such public places as concert halls, theaters, restaurants, and caba-
rets,"'10 4 courts consistently have construed the word "public" to
include more private places and more select groups of people.
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, for example, courts regularly
found infringement if performances managed to reach members of
"the public" even in the privacy of their hotel rooms or private
homes. 105 It was irrelevant that listeners could not communicate with
one another, as they could in a more public space. As the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals wrote in 1925,
Radio broadcasting is intended to, and in fact does, reach a very
much larger number of the public at the moment of the rendition
than any other medium of performance. The artist is consciously
addressing a great, though unseen and widely scattered, audience,
and is therefore participating in a public performance.
I0 6
In fact, under the old law, performances did not need to be even "the-
oretically accessible to the ... general public" in order to be public.
10 7
As one court observed, "[A] performance infringement could occur
'where there is only a segment of the public involved, such as those
people considered together because of common interest or pur-
pose' "' 0 8 -a definition that included almost any group, large or small.
103 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (giving copyright owners the
exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly").
104 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 60-2222 (1909)); see also H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 4 (stating that section (d)
of the Copyright Act of 1909 was "intended to give adequate protection to the propri-
etor of a dramatic work" whose "compensation comes solely from public representa-
tion of the work").
105 SeeJerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411, 412 (6th
Cir. 1925) (finding that radio broadcasts to private homes constitute public perform-
ance); Soc'y of European Stage Authors & Composers, Inc. v. N.Y. Hotel Statler Co.,
19 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (finding public performance when a hotel made
radio broadcasts available to guests in their rooms via "two central receiving sets").
106 Jerome H. Remick & Co., 5 F.2d at 412; see also Soc'y of European Stage Authors, 19
F. Supp. at 5 ("Clearly broadcasting within the hotel walls to the cross-section of the
public . . .must be as much a public performance as would be broadcasting in a
theatre.").
107 See Lerner v. Schectman, 228 F. Supp. 354, 355 (D. Minn. 1964) (holding per-
formances in a social club with private membership to be "public" for the purposes of
the statute).
108 Encyc. Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. 1247, 1254 (W.D.N.Y.
1983) (quoting Lerner, 228 F. Supp. at 355).
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In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress embraced these princi-
ples, providing (in § 101) that to perform a work "publicly" is:
(1) to perform ... it at a place open to the public or at any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of
a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance ... of the
work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable
of receiving the performance ... receive it in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times. 10 9
Under this statutory definition, a public performance can happen
either in a public place (such as a concert hall or theater) or in a
"semi-public place" 110 at which "a substantial number of persons
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is
gathered" 111-and one can have only so many social acquaintances. 12
A public performance also can happen when a person transmits a per-
formance to one of the places described above or to a group known
simply as "the public." 113
Not surprisingly, the foregoing definition has provided courts
with a significant amount of flexibility in finding performances to be
"public." In Columbia Pictures Industries v. Redd Home, Inc.,114 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether a video
store engaged in public performances by enabling its customers to
109 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "publicly").
110 See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278,
281 (9th Cir. 1989) (observing that "[o]ne of the principal purposes of the definition
[in § 101] was to make clear that . . . performances in 'semi-public' places such as
clubs, lodges, factories, summer camps, and schools are 'public performances' subject
to copyright control" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 64 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678)). Whether a place is "semi-public" is a factual question the
answer to which depends on "the size and composition of the audience." Columbia
Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1984).
111 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "publicly").
112 In Fermata International Melodies, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 712 F. Supp.
1257 (S.D. Tex. 1989), for example, the court found a public performance on the
ground that "twenty-one members plus guests [was] a 'substantial number of persons
outside of a normal circle of a family."' Id. at 1260. Presumably, the court meant to
include the statutory language "and its social acquaintances" as well.
113 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "publicly"). The object of that transmission must be
a performance, however, not simply the transmission of data. See United States v. Am.
Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
("The statutory language itself.., makes clear that the transmission of a performance,
rather than just the transmission of data constituting a media file, is required in order
to implicate the public performance right in a copyrighted work.").
114 749 F.2d 154.
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watch videos in private screening rooms.115 Employees played the
videos for customers by placing videotapes into "machines in the front
of the store," thus transmitting the pictures to the individual rooms.' 16
The court held these performances to be public because the video
store was "open to the public" under definition (1), even though the
screening rooms themselves were private and were used by people
who knew each other. 1 7 In dictum, the court also observed that the
performance satisfied definition (2) because the viewers were mem-
bers of "the public": "[T]he transmission of a performance to mem-
bers of the public, even in private settings such as [the screening]
rooms, constitutes a public performance."' 18
When the same court was asked to revisit the issue two years later
in Columbia Pictures Industries v. Aveco, Inc.,'" 9 it had no difficulty find-
ing more public performances, notwithstanding the fact that in this
video store, customers in private screening rooms played the videos
themselves on separate equipment. 120 Like the one in Redd Home, the
video store was "open to the public" under definition (1).121 "The
Copyright Act speaks of performances at a. place open to the public,"
wrote the court. 122 "It does not require that the public place be actu-
ally crowded with people. A telephone booth, a taxi cab, and even a
pay toilet are commonly regarded as 'open to the public,' even
though they are usually occupied only by one party at a time."1 23
Indeed, under the statute (as under the old cases), the same might be
said of rooms in hotels: hotel rooms are "indisputably" private when
occupied,' 24 but hotels, like video stores, are "open to the public"' 25
and their guests are members of that group known as "the public."
115 Id. at 156.
116 Id. at 157.
117 Id. at 159.
118 Id.
119 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
120 Id. at 61.
121 Id. at 63.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 789
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (observing that "hotel guest rooms are indisputably not public places
for copyright purposes"); see also Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Prof'l Real Estate Inves-
tors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[w]hile the hotel may
indeed be 'open to the public,' a guest's hotel room, once rented, is not").
125 Courts have disagreed on this point. Compare Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21,
Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding private video booths to be "open to
the public" because, as in Redd Horne and Aveco, "the proper inquiry is directed to the
nature of the place in which the private video booths are located, and whether it is a
place where the public is openly invited"), with On Command Video, 777 F. Supp. at 789
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If courts can reach performances in even the most private of
spaces, what of private homes? One might think that performances
cannot be public there; "a performance occurs where it is
received,"' 26 and under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at least,
the expectation of privacy inside the home has its "roots deep in the
common law." 127 When it comes to copyrightjurisprudence, however,
the law has never encouraged such an expectation, and the statute
reflects that fact. As a result, while a private home probably cannot be
described as "open to the public," the second half of definition (1)
provides that homeowners can violate the exclusive right of public
performance by, say, renting a copyrighted motion picture and show-
ing it to "a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of
a family and its social acquaintances.' 1 28 Granted, it would be difficult
to identify those homeowners, much less sue them, so copyright own-
ers have another alternative in definition (2), under which they can
target those who "transmit or otherwise communicate a perform-
ance ... of [a] work... to the public."'129 How does the public receive
such a transmission? It does so through the wires that connect to its
cable boxes and its televisions and its computers-in other words,
through the wires that connect it to the rest of the world.' 30 In other
words, definition (2) gives copyright owners the means to control the
information that private individuals receive in their homes, and it
does so in ways that definition (1) never could. For copyright owners,
this is precisely the point.
In the nineteenth century, people often experienced copyrighted
works in public, whether "in . . . concert halls, theaters, restaurants,
and cabarets"' 3' or in the public square. Nowadays, people tend to
experience copyrighted works in the privacy of their homes or cars-
alone or with a few family members, in front of radios or televisions or
(finding the defendant's argument that "the relevant place of performance is not the
individual hotel rooms but the entire hotel unavailing" because "[a]t least for the
purposes of public place analysis, a performance of a work does not occur every place
a wire carrying the performance passes through," but instead, "a performance occurs
where it is received," i.e., in individual rooms). The court in On Command Video went
on to find a public performance via transmission under definition (2). See id. at 790.
126 On Command Video, 777 F. Supp. at 789.
127 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
128 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "publicly").
129 See id.
130 See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, 192 F. Supp. 2d 321,
332 (D.N.J. 2002) (finding public performance under definition (2) when the defen-
dant transmitted video clips to individual computer users over the Internet).
131 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 60-2222 (1909)).
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computers. Congress and the courts have recognized this shift, and
they have defined "publicly" to reach the sorts of conduct that once
occurred in public places.1 32 But in defining the "public" part of pub-
lic performance so broadly, lawmakers also have managed to reach
the sort of conduct that always occurred in private. Why? The answer
may be that performance is replacing distribution as the means by
which people experience copyrighted works,1 33 and lawmakers simply
are trying to reach these experiences. In doing so, however,
lawmakers have given copyright owners the ability to exact a fee at
"each step in the process by which a protected work wends its way to
its audience."1 34 The result is so broad as to reveal something interest-
ing about the performance right: it is not really about performances at
all.
C. It's Not Really About Performances at All
Once playwrights and songwriters began enforcing their rights,
courts soon were asked to decide what constituted a "performance"-
a term that Congress had failed to define in 1909.135 This question
proved to be thornier than one might expect. In the early twentieth
century, as now, "the paradigm image of a public performance" was
''an actor seen and heard by an audience assembled in his immediate
presence." 13 6 But it was the age of radio; surely the statutory language
could be made to capture more conduct than this. At first it seemed
as if the answer might be "no." In Buck v. Debaum, 137 decided in 1929,
the court refused to find that the defendant had performed a copy-
righted song merely by playing it over the radio in his cafe. "The per-
formance in such case takes place in the studio of the broadcasting
132 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005).
133 This answer begs several questions, including whether this is a good thing, see
infra Part II, and whether the performance right should share at least some of the
limitations on the distribution right, including the "first sale" doctrine, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(a) (2000); infra note 253 and accompanying text.
134 See David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 759
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
135 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075, repealed by Copyright Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly
Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 876 n.4 (2d Cir. 1967) (chronicling statutes granting perform-
ance rights and observing that "[o]n none of these occasions did Congress attempt to
delineate the boundaries of the right," even in the legislative history), rev'd, 392 U.S.
390 (1968), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541.
136 See United Artists, 377 F.2d at 876 n.4 (citing Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am.
Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925)) (other citation omitted).
137 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
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station," the court observed, "and the operator of the receiving set in
effect does nothing more than one would do who opened a window
and permitted the strains of music of a passing band to come within
the inclosure in which he was located. '1 38
Two years later, however, the Supreme Court disagreed. In Buck
v. Je-well-LaSalle Realty Co., 1-9 the same plaintiff, Gene Buck, charged
the LaSalle Hotel with "maintain [ing] a master radio receiving set...
wired to each of the public and private rooms" in a hotel.140 (Buck
was the President of ASCAP. 141) The defendant argued that it was
merely receiving radio signals, to which the Copyright Act could "not
reasonably be construed as applicable,"' 42 but the Court believed oth-
erwise. Noting that the hotel, like an orchestra, produced music "by
instrumentalities under its control, ' 143 the Court declared itself "satis-
fied that the reception of a radio broadcast and its translation into
audible sound is not a mere audition of the original program."'144 It
was, instead, "essentially a reproduction."'' 45
In fact, the reception of a radio broadcast was nothing like a
reproduction, at least in copyright terms. Under the "first sale" doc-
trine, located in section 41 of the Copyright Act of 1909, the exclusive
right to vend copies of a copyrighted work did not include the right to
restrict the later transfer of those copies. 146 The copyright owner was
limited to one payment per copy sold. The performance right was
138 Id. at 735; see also id. (holding that "[o]ne who manually or by human agency
merely actuates electrical instrumentalities, whereby inaudible elements that are
omnipresent in the air are made audible to persons who are within hearing, does not
'perform' within the meaning of the Copyright Law").
139 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
140 Id. at 195.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 196.
143 Id. at 201.
144 Id. at 199-200.
145 Id. at 200.
146 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084, repealed by Copy-
right Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (providing that "nothing in this
Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copy-
righted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained"); see also Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (holding that "the copyright stat-
utes.., do not create the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a
limitation [on the price] at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchas-
ers"). Interestingly, in Bobbs-Mer-ill, the Court limited the application of the doctrine
to those future vendors "with whom there [was] no privity of contract" with the copy-
right owner. Id.; cf ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996)
(stating that "[s] hrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their terms are objectiona-
ble on grounds applicable to contracts in general").
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subject to no such limitation. Although the defendant in Jewell-LaSalle
"urg[ed] that it did not perform, because there can be but one actual
performance each time a copyrighted selection is rendered,"'47 the
Court found no support for such an argument in the statute. It wrote,
instead, that "nothing in the act... prevents a single rendition of a
copyrighted selection from resulting in more than one public per-
formance for profit."' 48 In other words, a singer could perform a
song in the studio of a radio station; the radio could perform the song
again by transmitting it as a radio signal; and a hotel could perform
the song yet again by receiving that signal and making it audible to
guests. The "development of radio broadcasting" had transformed a
single act of song into three acts of copyright significance for which
the songwriter could demand payment. 149 Multiply three acts times
the quantity of radio stations (and hotels) and the infringing acts
could number in the hundreds of thousands.
By 1968, however, the Supreme Court appeared to have changed
its mind. In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,150 the
defendant operated a community antenna television (CATV) station
that captured and relayed the signals of copyrighted motion pictures
to its rural subscribers, who were unable to receive the signals other-
wise.' 5 ' The Court began by noting that the station operator had "not
'perform [ed]' the ... copyrighted works in any conventional sense of
that term, or in any manner envisaged by the Congress that enacted
the law in 1909."152 The issue, therefore, was "the function that CATV
plays in the total process of television broadcasting and reception."'153
Comparing the station operator to "the exhibitor of a motion picture
or stage play," the Court found their roles to be quite different:
"Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform .... One is treated
as active performer; the other, as passive beneficiary."'154 The station
147 Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 197-98.
148 Id. at 198.
149 See id. (observing that "[w]hile this may not have been possible before the
development of radio broadcasting, the novelty of the means used does not lessen the
duty of the courts to give full protection to the monopoly of public performance for
profit which Congress has secured to the composer").
150 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
151 Id. at 391-93.
152 Id. at 395; see also id. at 395 n.15 (observing that "[t]he legislative history shows
that the attention of Congress was directed to the situation where the dialogue of a
play is transcribed by a member of the audience, and thereafter the play is produced
by another party with the aid of the transcript" (citing H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 4
(1909))).
153 Id. at 397.
154 Id. at 398-99.
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operator, for its part, had done "no more than enhance[ ] the
viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's signals," and as a
"viewer," it had not engaged in a performance under the statute.
5 5
In dissent, Justice Fortas accused the majority of ignoring Jewell-
LaSalle,15 6 but the majority found a way to distinguish the case. 157 It
seemed clear that the ground had shifted.
The Court confirmed this shift in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken,158 in which it refused, once again, to find a performance-in
this case by the proprietor of George Aiken's Chicken, who was sued
for playing the radio through "four speakers in the ceiling" of his res-
taurant.1 5 9 For the Court, finding a performance on these facts
"would be to authorize the sale of an untold number of licenses for
what is basically a single public rendition of a copyrighted work," 160
and it refused to do so. The courts thus had ended where they began:
in 1975, as in 1929, a restaurant owner who played the radio for his
customers was a member of the audience, not a performer.16' As the
Aiken Court put it:
If, by analogy to a live performance in a concert hall or cabaret, a
radio station "performs" a musical composition when it broadcasts
it, the same analogy would seem to require the conclusion that
those who listen to the broadcast through the use of radio receivers
do not perform the composition. 16
2
Viewed with the benefit of hindsight, the fight over the meaning
of "performance" was a fight about philosophy. The Aiken Court, in
particular, took the utilitarian view, finding that a multiplicity of royal-
ties not only was unnecessary to encourage creation, but also "would
be wholly at odds with the balanced congressional purpose behind 17
U.S.C. § 1 (e).' 1 63 As the Court famously wrote, the limited scope of
copyright "reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public
interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts."'164 The greater the
155 Id. at 399-401.
156 Id. at 404-05 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
157 See id. at 396 n.18 (majority opinion) (noting that in Jewell-LaSalle the original
broadcast had been unlicensed).
158 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
159 Id. at 152.
160 Id. at 162-63.
161 See Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
162 Aiken, 422 U.S. at 159.
163 Id. at 163.
164 Id. at 156.
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potential audience, the greater the benefit to society (and, seconda-
rily, to copyright owners). By contrast, the dissenters in Fortnightly and
Aiken were of the view that Congress had given playwrights and song-
writers the right to capture the value they had created-not some of
it, but all of it. It was a question of freeriding: concurring in Aiken,
Justice Blackmun emphasized that Aiken played the radio "for the
entertainment and edification of his customers," thus adding to "the
atmosphere and attraction of his establishment. 1 65 Having enjoyed
that benefit without paying for it, Aiken was "something more than a
mere listener" and therefore was guilty of infringement. 166 Oddly,
under this way of thinking, the greater the audience for a copyrighted
work, the greater the harm. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
wrote in Fortnightly, "A television broadcast of a copyrighted work
harms the copyright holder not because a handful or a roomful of
persons sees the work performed at the studio, but because thousands
of viewers watch it in their homes."167
Between the two poles, there was room for compromise. One
such compromise was to define "performance" broadly but to use
other doctrines, such as implied license, to limit liability. There was
precedent for this approach. In Debaum, the court had suggested that
by licensing a radio station to broadcast a copyrighted song, the plain-
tiffs had "impliedly sanctioned and consented to any 'pick up' out of
the air that was possible in radio reception."' 68 Even in Jewell-LaSalle,
Justice Brandeis had been willing to entertain this theory, writing for
the Court that "[i]f the copyrighted composition had been [origi-
nally] broadcast. . . with plaintiffs' consent, a license for its commer-
cial reception and distribution by the hotel company might possibly
have been implied.' 69 (Unfortunately for the LaSalle Hotel, the orig-
inal broadcast had been unlicensed. 170 ) The defendant in Fortnightly
pressed this argument before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
causing the court to wonder whether Justice Brandeis had meant a
165 Id. at 164-65 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
166 Id. at 165; see also Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S.
390, 406 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he use of mechanical equipment to
extend a broadcast to a significantly wider public than the broadcast would otherwise
enjoy constitutes a 'performance' of the material originally broadcast."), superseded by
statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
167 United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 879 (2d Cir.
1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
168 Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
169 Buck v.Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 199 n.5 (1931) (citing Debaum,
40 F.2d 734).
170 See id.; supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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license implied in fact or in law. 171 In the end, however, the court
rejected the theory. 172 Licenses implied in fact had become problem-
atic, given that groups like ASCAP had begun to include express limi-
tations in their contracts with broadcasters.1 7 3 And whatever the
philosophical merits of finding a license implied in law, 174 provision
for such a thing was notably absent from the statute.
175
If, by 1975, the law seemed to side with the utilitarians, everything
changed by the end of 1976, when Congress enacted the new Copy-
right Act.176 Taking the side of the dissenters in Fortnightly and Aiken,
Congress defined "performance" broadly,1 77 explicitly stating that a
multiplicity of royalties was no more than copyright owners were
due. 178 In the report accompanying the bill that became the Copy-
right Act of 1976, House members described the performance right as
follows:
Under the definitions of "perform,"... "publicly," and "transmit" in
section 101, the concept[ ] of public performance . . .cover[s] not
only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further act by
which that rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to
the public. Thus, for example: a singer is performing when he or
she sings a song; a broadcasting network is performing when it
transmits his or her performance (whether simultaneously or from
records); a local broadcaster is performing when it transmits the
network broadcast; a cable television system is performing when it
retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers; and any individual is
performing whenever he or she plays a phonorecord embodying
171 Fortnightly, 377 F.2d at 880.
172 Id. at 883.
173 Id. at 880-81.
174 For the defendant in Fortnightly, the (utilitarian) argument "proceed [ed] from
the principle that the primary purpose of the Copyright Act is to encourage authors
and artists to release their works to the public, and that reward to the copyright
holder is a secondary aim incidental to this general purpose." Id. at 881 (collecting
cases); see also id. (noting the defendant's contention that "[the secondary aim of
reward to the copyright holder is satisfied ... when the holder has been induced to
license the original television broadcast," whereupon "the Copyright Act's primary
policy then requires that ... [the] defendant[ ] be allowed to transmit the broadcast
signals without further payment to the copyright holder").
175 Id. at 882 ("'[A] monopoly is expressly granted of all public performances for
profit."' (quoting Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 197)).
176 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
177 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "perform").
178 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5676-77.
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the performance or communicates the performance by turning on
a receiving set.' 79
Today, only the addition of the word "publicly" to the performance
right in § 106 prevents copyright owners from pursuing the individual
in this story, and only, as we have seen, if she plays the phonorecord in
a space open only to "a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances."' 80  The list of unregulated acts has shrunk
considerably.
Dissenting in Fortnightly in 1968, Justice Fortas would have held
that "the use of mechanical equipment to extend a broadcast to a sig-
nificantly wider public than the broadcast would otherwise enjoy con-
stitutes a 'performance' of the material originally broadcast."' 81 He
was confident that such a ruling would not unduly burden the public
because, according to "leading authority" Melville Nimmer, groups
like ASCAP "'do not choose to enforce the Jewell-LaSalle doctrine to its
logical extreme in that they do not demand performing licenses from
commercial establishments such as bars and restaurants which operate
radio or television sets for the amusement of their customers."' 18 2
Unfortunately, Nimmer was wrong. Having awakened to the benefits
of the performance right, the Society and others have stopped trying
to draw the line at enforcing it.183 What is more, now that Congress
has enabled this tendency by metering every path that a copyrighted
work might take to the consumer, the performance right no longer
exists to capture the value of performances in the usual sense.
Instead, it exists to identify and control what I term the "conduits" to
the marketplace-those who deliver copyrighted works to those who
experience them. In other words, the performance right exists to stop
licensing opportunities from leaking out the gaps in the publication
right (also known as the "distribution right," found in § 106(3)).184
179 Id.
180 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "publicly"); supra Part I.B.
181 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 406 (1968)
(Fortas, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,
90 Stat. 2541.
182 Id. at 405 n.3 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 107.41
n.204 (1968)).
183 Cf Registration of Designs: Hearing on H.R. 6458 Before the H. Comm. on Patents,
64th Cong. 23 (1916) (statement of C.R. Clifford) (advocating property rights in
industrial designs but acknowledging that in granting rights, it was "difficult to define
exactly how far to go," as "[w]e know where to begin, but we do not know exactly
where to stop").
184 In this Article, I use the phrase "publication right" because I mean to include
not only the modem doctrine of "distribution," see 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000 & Supp.
IV 2004), but also its historical antecedent, "publication," which included acts of copy-
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By giving copyright owners the ability to go after conduits that are two,
three, or four degrees of separation away from the copyright owner,
Congress has given copyright owners the power to control distribu-
tions in a way that the distribution right itself forbids.
How does this work? As we have seen, playwrights, songwriters,
and others like them long have enjoyed the exclusive right to publish
ing only as predicates to acts of distribution, see L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair
Use, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 262 (1992) (describing the right to copy as a
"predicate right"); supra note 26.
Historically, the publication right had several components, namely, "printing,
reprinting, publishing, and vending" copies of a copyrighted work, and those compo-
nents were exercised as one right. See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair
Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (1987) (arguing that in 1909, Congress "unwittingly
enlarged the copyright owner's rights in printed works to include-in addition to the
rights to print, reprint, publish, and vend the copyrighted work-the exclusive right
to copy the copyrighted work"); see also Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 933 n.180 (2007) ("Professor Patterson believed that Congress
inserted the word 'copying' intending it to apply only to works of the fine arts. ....").
Today, those rights reside in two divisible parts of § 106: in subsection (1), the exclu-
sive right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies" (i.e., to print and reprint);
and in subsection (3), the exclusive right "to distribute copies... of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lend-
ing" (i.e., to publish and vend). See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
That is, unlike copyright owners of old, copyright owners today can exercise these
rights separately, and indeed they often do-punishing copying in the absence of any
act of public distribution, or indeed, any public act at all. See id. § 201 (d) (2) (2000)
("Any... subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred
as provided by clause (1) and owned separately.").
In correspondence, Mark Lemley has expressed his skepticism that withholding
the performance right would "do any good" because on the Internet, at least, every-
thing that qualifies as a performance also qualifies as a copy, thus infringing both
§ 106(1) and § 106(4). See Lemley, supra note 11, at 579 ("In the Net cases .... it is
the same act that is both an authorized reproduction and an unauthorized perform-
ance ...."); see also Loren, supra note 6, at 689-91 (describing the overlap between
the reproduction and performance right in the context of digital deliveries of music);
R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, Major Con-
troversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MiAMi L. REV. 237, 249-65 (2001) (same). Lemley is
right, of course. I would solve this problem by withholding both rights (or, in the case
of the performance right, by withholding or limiting it). As I have argued elsewhere,
copyright owners suffer "competitive harm" not when their works are copied, but
when their works are distributed in copies to the public, and therefore, "granting
creators the exclusive right of reproduction provides them with a greater benefit than
they are entitled to expect." Stadler, supra, at 939. 1 therefore have argued that Con-
gress should remove § 106(1) from the Copyright Act entirely, withholding from cop-
yright owners the right to prevent others from copying their works, but granting them
the right to exclude those unauthorized copies from the marketplace. See id.
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(i.e., to "print[ ], reprint[ ], publish[ ], and vend[ ]")185 copies of
their works. For almost as long, however, this publication right has
been subject to a very important limitation. Pursuant to that limita-
tion, known as the "first sale" doctrine, the first (authorized) sale of a
copy of a copyrighted work forever exhausts the publication right as to
that copy. 186 That is, once a songwriter has authorized the printing
and sale of a compact disc containing one of her songs, she cannot
demand a royalty from those who succeed to ownership of that com-
pact disc. The songwriter has a right as against the first conduit to the
marketplace, but not as against the second, third, or fourth.
These gaps in the distribution right are no accident; Congress
intended them to exist.1 87 Moreover, Congress did not create the per-
formance right to give copyright owners an end run around the first
sale doctrine, but to provide them with a means of punishing third
parties who would avoid the first sale entirely-e.g., by treating a
license to experience a performance into a license to copy it.188 So
conceived, the early performance right benefited two types of proprie-
tors: first, those whose "compensation [came] solely from public rep-
resentation of the work,"'189 and second, those who did publish copies
of their works, but were unable to stop third parties from making
unauthorized copies.' 90 If anything, the performance right was cre-
ated in service of the distribution right, not in derogation of its
limitations.
185 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436; Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15,
§ 1, 1 Star. 124, 124.
186 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or pho-
norecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy or phonorecord."); supra note 146 and accompanying
text.
187 See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 19 (1909) ("Your committee feel that it would be
most unwise to permit the copyright proprietor to exercise any control whatever over
the article which is the subject of copyright after said proprietor has made the first
sale.").
188 See Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32, 46 (1882) ("The ticket of admission is a
license to witness the play, but it cannot be treated as a license to the spectator to
represent the drama if he can by memory recollect it .... .
189 See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 4.
190 See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395 n.15
(1968) ("The legislative history shows that the attention of Congress was directed to
the situation where the dialogue of a play is transcribed by a member of the audience,
and thereafter the play is produced by another party with the aid of the transcript."
(citing H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 4)), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
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The performance right shifted as technology made the exploita-
tion of copyrighted works increasingly profitable (for the conduits)
after the copyright owner had surrendered title to her copies. So far
as copyright owners were concerned, some means of sharing in these
profits had to be found. The publication right was inadequate to the
task because the conduits were free to profit from public demand for
copyrighted works after purchasing licensed copies, so long as they
did not "print" and "vend" copies themselves. Once a radio station
had purchased a phonograph record, for example, it could play that
record over the radio without violating this core right. The perform-
ance right, for its part, provided copyright owners with some ability to
capture this value, but at its inception, at least, the right seemed
designed to target those "paradigm" performances at which both per-
former and audience were present, together, in a public place.1 91
Courts needed to be convinced to construe the right more broadly.
Once copyright owners had succeeded in persuading courts to define
"perform" and "publicly" so as to capture those engaging in transmis-
sions (here, the radio station), they focused their efforts on those
receiving transmissions, such as the LaSalle Hotel and George Aiken's
Chicken. Copyright owners suffered a few losses in the process, but
what they failed to win in the courts, they later won in Congress. The
stage was set for the performance right-that understudy to the distri-
bution right-to play the leading role in securing to copyright owners
the profits they believed themselves to deserve.
The irony is that people today experience many of the same types
of copyrighted works as they once did; only the technology of experi-
ence has changed. People act favorite scenes from plays for the bene-
fit of their friends, only now they might do so by posting the video on
YouTube. People play music at parties: once, this experience involved
a pianist, a piano, and a set of sheet music; now it might involve a
radio station and a receiver. People watch episodes of television
shows they missed, not by taping the episode and watching it later, at
home,192 but by watching the episode on their iPods. The difference
between then and now, of course, is that the increasing reach of the
performance right has turned ordinary experiences into acts with cop-
191 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975) (observ-
ing that Congress originally intended to prohibit only those performances "in such
public places as concert halls, theaters, restaurants, and cabarets"); United Artists Tel-
evision, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 876 n.4 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S.
390 (1968), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541.
192 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-56
(1984) (finding such uses to be "fair" under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)).
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yright significance. If every means of experiencing a copyrighted
work involves either a distribution, a performance, or both, then the
law has given copyright owners the power to reach the private enjoy-
ment of copyrighted works. Not only is this power unprecedented,
but it also comes at a heavy cost. The question that Congress (and
scholars) should be asking is whether society should be required to
pay it. What, precisely, is the public interest in regulating perform-
ances of copyrighted works? 193 I address this question in Part II.
II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN REGULATING PERFORMANCE
In the United States, at least, copyright law has a primarily utilita-
rian purpose. To quote the Supreme Court in Aiken, copyright
"reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest";194
private reward is justified only if, on balance, that reward works a net
benefit to society. 195 In order to determine whether the performance
right achieves this balance, one must begin by identifying the costs
and benefits of the right. Toward that end, let us consider the path
that a typical song might take to the marketplace.
A songwriter writes the music and lyrics of a popular song; a
group of performers performs it; and a record company furnishes a
producer and a set of sound engineers, who shape and record the
performance in a studio, creating a "master recording." Absent the
inevitable assignments of copyright, several people now share in the
ownership of two separate copyrights in the result: (1) the songwriter
owns the first copyright in the song, known as the "musical work"; (2)
the performers own the second copyright in the sound recording, but
only to the extent of their original authorship; and (3) the producer
almost certainly has a share in the second copyright, too. 196 Indeed,
193 See Stadler, supra note 184, at 909-27 (describing the strands of the public
interest in copyright law).
194 Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156; see also id. ("Creative work is to be encouraged and
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.").
195 See generally Sara K Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REv.
609, 667-69 (2006) (discussing the history of the utilitarian concept in American cop-
yright law, using forgery as an analytical tool).
196 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5669 (describing the "authorship" in a sound recording "both on the part of the per-
formers ... and on the part of the record producer responsible for setting up the
recording session, capturing and electronically processing the sounds, and compiling
and editing them to make the final sound recording"); see alsoJCW Invs., Inc. v. Nov-
elty, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 2003) ("The author of a sound record-
ing is the performer(s) or record producer or both." (citing 1 MELVIN B. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.10[A] [2] [b], at 2-172.5 to 172.6 (2001))).
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under this theory, even the sound engineers might enjoy a slice of the
pie.
The record company cannot press and sell compact discs contain-
ing the master recording without first clearing the rights to the copy-
rights embodied in it. What licenses must the company secure? It
probably does not need to negotiate a license to the sound recording
because the record company probably required the performers, the
producer, and the sound engineers to execute an assignment of copy-
right in the sound recording in return for a complicated schedule of
royalty payments. 19 7 Even so, the record company must license the
rights to reproduce and distribute copies of the musical work. These
rights reside in the songwriter or, more likely, in the music publishing
company to which she assigned her reproduction and distribution
rights (again, in return for royalties). 198 The record company is free
to negotiate with the music publishing company, and indeed it often
does. If, however, those negotiations prove difficult, the record com-
pany need not negotiate at all. Since 1909, songwriters who authorize
the distribution of their works on phonorecords have been subject to
a compulsory license (the "mechanical license"),199 which pays them
the government rate per copy (currently "9.1 cents or 1.75 cents per
minute of playing time or fraction thereof, whichever is greater").200
In order to claim this license, the record company must give the song-
writer (or her publisher) notice of its intent to secure a mechanical
license for every musical work on the disc before distributing those
discs to the public. 20 1
Yet neither a negotiated license of the reproduction and distribu-
tion rights nor a mechanical license gives its holder the right to per-
form the song. The publication right 20 2 and the performance right 20 3
are legally "divisible," which means that each one may be subdivided,
197 See DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRIES 715, 720-22 (5th ed. 2007) (describing a typical recording agreement
between a record company and a recording artist).
198 DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS
206-23 (6th ed. 2006) (describing from whom publishers collect royalties and the
contractual clauses that determine how such royalties will be distributed).
199 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2000) (describing the terms of the license); supra
note 78 and accompanying text.
200 See U.S. Copyright Office, Licensing and Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel
Information, http://www.copyright.gov/carp/#mechanical (last visited Jan. 28,
2008).
201 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(b) (2000).
202 See id. § 106(3) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
203 See id. § 106(4).
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transferred, and "owned separately. '2 0 4 As a consequence, if the
record company wishes to perform the popular song, it must secure a
second license (i.e., a performance license) from the songwriter or,
more likely, from the performing rights society to which she assigned
a portion of the performance right 205 -ASCAP, say. Others who wish
to perform the song bear the same burden; everyone from the owner
of a radio station to the owner of a chicken restaurant must secure a
performance license if he wishes to "perform" the song "publicly," as
Congress has (broadly) defined those terms.206
To complicate things further, the foregoing performance licenses
only cover the musical work itself. The sound recording-the actual
performance-is the subject of a separate copyright, owned and
licensed separately. 20 7 As we have seen, that copyright is limited; own-
ers of copyright in sound recordings (here, the record company) do
not enjoy the performance right in § 106(4).208 Under the terms of
§ 106(6), however, they do enjoy the exclusive right to "perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmis-
sion,"209 i.e., over satellite radio or the Internet. Anyone who wishes
to perform the sound recording in these media must secure yet
another license, this time from the record company (or its representa-
tive).210 The explanation for this distinction between analog and digi-
tal media is primarily political,211 and as a result many scholars have
argued that owners of copyright in sound recordings should enjoy the
performance right in analog media as well as digital ones. 212 To date,
Congress has not extended the right accordingly. If ever such a thing
were to happen, however, then more licensing would be required. In
204 Id. § 201(d).
205 PAssMAN, supra note 198, at 224-27.
206 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "perform" and "publicly").
207 PAssmAN, supra note 198, at 310.
208 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
209 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
210 See PASSMAN, supra note 198, at 292-97.
211 See infra notes 306-12 and accompanying text.
212 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Owners of copyright in musical
works, for their part, have opposed such a proposal because they suspect that:
(a) conduits would resist paying substantially higher royalties; and (b) existing royalty
streams would be shared among more claimants, giving each claimant a reduced por-
tion of the royalty "pie." See Paul Goldstein, Commentary on "An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Collectives, "78 VA. L. REv. 413, 414 (1992) (stating that if Congress granted a
broad performance right in sound recordings, "[o]ne outcome might be that total
royalties from performance rights would remain the same," and thus the performing
rights societies "would have to battle the recording industry over the slice of the pie
that each obtains").
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this example, both the owner of the radio station and the owner of
the chicken shack would be on the hook for two royalty payments for
each song they happened to perform: one payment to the songwriter,
and one payment to the record company. Multiply these payments by
the number of radio stations (and chicken restaurants) in America,
and the number starts to look like real money.
Now suppose that the recorded song reaches the ears of a movie
producer, who decides to play it in the background of her new movie
and include it on the soundtrack. The movie producer cannot
include the recorded song in her film without securing several
licenses of her own. First, if she wishes to include the song as
recorded, she must license the rights to both the musical work and the
sound recording: the former is known as a "synchronization license"
because it enables the licensee to synchronize the song with the mov-
ing pictures of the film; and the latter is known as a "master license"
because it does the same with respect to the master recording (in cop-
yright terms, the sound recording). 2 13 As one might expect, however,
neither of these licenses includes the right to use the song on a sound-
track. For that, the movie producer would need two (and possibly
three) more licenses: (1) from the songwriter (or her publisher),
either a negotiated license or a mechanical license giving the movie
producer the right to reproduce and distribute the musical work on
compact discs;21 4 (2) from the recording company, a license to "dupli-
cate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords . . . that ...
recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording";2 15 and (3) from
the performing rights society, a performance license, if the movie pro-
ducer plans to perform the song in public (except as part of the
film),216 What began as a musical work has become a musical work
wrapped in a sound recording wrapped in an audiovisual work.2 1 7
More layers mean more licenses, which mean more payments (and
more lawyers).
At this point, the songwriter is receiving five payments for the use
of her musical work: two under the terms of negotiated or mechanical
licenses (through the agency of her publisher); two under perform-
ance licenses (through the agency of ASCAP); and one under a syn-
chronization license. The recording company, for its part, is receiving
213 See PAssMAN, supra note 198, at 231-33, 416-17.
214 See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
215 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2000).
216 See PASSMAN, supra note 198, at 224-27 (stating that performance rights socie-
ties are unable to collect "public performance-monies" for films shown in American
movie theaters).
217 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "audiovisual works").
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up to three payments for the use of its sound recording: one under
the terms of the master license; one under the license enabling the
reproduction and distribution of the soundtrack; and one for any
public performances of its work "by means of a digital audio transmis-
sion."2 18 Not surprisingly, the movie producer, too, has the right to
demand payments from those who seek to make protected uses of her
film. 2 19 These payments may not amount to much, particularly when
calculated as a percentage of the revenues that each party expects the
project to generate. Taken together, however, they form a web of
entitlement that imposes significant transaction costs on those who
have the inclination and resources to bear them.
Given the existence of this web, is it any wonder that the future of
such freewheeling virtual spaces as YouTube seems to be in doubt?
Consider the fortunes of an ordinary person who posts a video on
YouTube: even if she could determine who owns which copyright in
the video, she could not afford to pay the royalties that copyright own-
ers are likely to demand. Instead, she simply posts the video, which is
prima facie infringing,220 and that video resides on the YouTube serv-
ers only until a rightsholder in the video complains and the video is
removed. Unless the video is available for purchase-and many video
clips are not-it simply disappears (except from the hard drives of a
few enthusiasts).
One might think that if an infringing video on YouTube does not
compete with anything rightsholders are marketing, then right-
sholders would be uninterested in enforcing their rights as against the
218 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
219 Id. § 102(a) (6) (2000) (listing "motion pictures" among the categories of copy-
rightable works).
220 A person posting a video to YouTube probably has reproduced it first, likely by
copying it to the hard drive of her computer, thus violating § 106(1). See 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "copies" as "material objects ... in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device"); id. § 106(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (giving copyright owners
the exclusive right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies"). In addition, post-
ing the video might qualify as a public distribution under § 106(3). See id. § 101
(Supp. V 2005) (defining "publication," in part, as "[t]he offering to distribute copies
or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public
performance, or public display"); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (observing that § 106(3) "recognized for the first time a
distinct statutory right of first publication"). But see Stadler, supra note 184, at 941
n.217 ("[U]nder this definition, an offer to distribute copies of a work to the public
for purposes of reproduction would not constitute publication-and arguably would
not constitute distribution, either."). As we have seen, the posting qualifies as a pub-
lic performance under § 106(4). See supra Part I.B-C.
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ordinary person who posted it. For copyright owners, however, an
unlicensed use represents a loss of profit, even in the absence of a
substitutive harm. 221 Indeed, for many rightsholders, profits are sec-
ondary; the primary goal is not profit, but control over copyrighted
content. For those who share this goal, rights are both the tools and
the justification for their use. And as legal tools go, the performance
right is a particularly powerful one: in return for a single act of crea-
tion (most likely by somebody else), the right gives copyright owners
the ability to demand a royalty payment nearly every time the physical
manifestation of a performance leaps from mouth to ear, from stage
to eye, from radio station to car, and from dish to coaxial cable to
television set. At the rate of (literally) millions of leaps per year, the
benefits to copyright owners are obvious-which means, in turn, that
some of the costs should be obvious, too.
Among the obvious costs are the ones that can be measured in
actual dollars, such as the royalty payments themselves, which likely
were passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices. 222
Another hard cost is the amount of money spent on copyright clear-
ance-that is, the process of identifying and obtaining licenses to use
copyrighted works.223 As in the foregoing hypothetical, it can be
extraordinarily complicated (and therefore expensive) to negotiate
with multiple owners of overlapping rights. Indeed, it can be even
more costly to identify those owners in the first place, particularly with
respect to works created decades ago. As Justice Breyer observed in
his dissent in Eldred v. Ashcrof,22 4 the need to clear rights even "can
221 See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994)
(rejecting the fair use defense because "a viable market for licensing these rights"
existed, and the defendant failed to take such a license, despite having the ability to
do so); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 887 (2007) (explaining how the "practice of unneeded licensing feeds
back into doctrine," creating "a steady, incremental, unintended expansion of copy-
right, caused by nothing more than ambiguous doctrine and prudent behavior on the
part of copyright users").
222 The royalty percentage of each dollar spent on the purchase of a sound record-
ing varies by artist. For a new artist, the figure is thirteen to sixteen percent; for
midlevel artists, the figure is fifteen to seventeen percent; and for superstars, it is
eighteen to twenty percent. PASSMAN, supra note 198, at 86. Deducted from these
royalties are costs such as producer royalties, packaging, free goods, and reserves. See
M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SYDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 20-21 (10th ed.
2007).
223 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 250-52 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
224 537 U.S. 186.
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inhibit or prevent the use of old works . . .because the [copyright]
holder may prove impossible to find."225
Even these costs might be worth bearing if the existence of the
performance right gave creators the marginal incentive to provide
society with a wealth of performable works. Although effects like
these are almost impossible to quantify, one suspects that even here,
the costs of the performance right outweigh its benefits. Earlier, I
hinted at the costs to giving copyright owners the ability to control
how people experience copyrighted works in private spaces. 226 These
costs have not escaped the notice of copyright scholars, a number of
whom, like Julie Cohen, have grown increasingly uncomfortable with
a system under which "all conduct is public and most justice is pri-
vate." 227 Not only does such a system threaten privacy interests, 228 but
it also breeds a nation of passive consumers. Once the public under-
stands that the law reserves to copyright owners the right to control
the content that reaches private homes, then the public looks to the
media alone for its entertainment and enrichment.229 This depen-
dence on the media, in turn, affects the quality and diversity of works
available to the public: as media companies strive to produce predict-
able hits, they find themselves "[s]eeking the common denominator
among a wider audience."2 0 In the end, much of the available con-
225 Id. at 250 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
226 See supra Part I.B.
227 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright's Public-Private Distinction, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 963,
965 (2005); see also id. ("This result.., is one with which most thoughtful commenta-
tors do not seem entirely comfortable."); id. at 967 ("[W]e need a theory of the ordi-
nary user: a theory of what conduct is private."); Stadler, supra note 184, at 937-42
(arguing that copyright owners should not enjoy the exclusive right to reproduction,
in part because it implicates private conduct).
228 See Cohen, supra note 227, at 969 (urging the maintenance of a "breathing
space for intellectual consumption, exploration, and development"). Also threaten-
ing this breathing space is "[t] he collection of information about what we see, hear,
and read," id., which has become disturbingly commonplace as copyright owners seek
to manage their rights using digital technology.
229 See Stadler, supra note 184, at 947 ("To the extent that the law today requires
members of the public to be 'consumers' instead of 'users,' copyright owners can
train the public to satisfy its demand for expression by looking to the copyright indus-
tries alone."); see also Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Infor-
mation Production, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 81, 97-98 (2002) (using Disney as an
example, asserting that "increased prevalence of Mickeys should lead to increased
investment in forming preferences for their products," which in turn "should increase
relative demand for their products").
230 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. Rr,. 813, 888 (2001); see also id. at
889 ("As a result, striving for popularity may produce not a wonderful, cacophonous
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tent looks and sounds the same. 23 1 "Users" 232 can (and do) challenge
this "wearying homogeneity" 23 3 at the margins, but the threat of copy-
right infringement keeps most of the populace from engaging too
actively with the content they consume.234
Perhaps the most significant way in which the performance right
imposes costs on society, however, is by encouraging copyright owners
to provide the public with experiences without also providing the pub-
lic with tangible copies. As we have seen, a copyright owner exhausts
her right to control the distribution of her work in copies once she
has made the first sale. 235 By contrast, her right to control (and
charge for) public performances is limited only by a handful of tech-
nical defenses. 236 Knowing this, rightsholders have learned to deliver
their copyrighted works accordingly, favoring mechanisms by which
electronic content is either streamed or (if downloaded) subject to a
host of technological access controls.23 7 Whither physical copies?
Suddenly, the name of the game is evanescence: if consumers cannot
possess a copyrighted work, then rightsholders can charge consumers a
royalty each time consumers experience it.
One consequence of this emphasis on performance over publica-
tion is scarcity, at least in archival terms. Those who own copyright in
performances can prevent copies from being made, even of works that
otherwise would not be available in tangible form-thus giving copy-
right law the ability to determine the content of our cultural heri-
tage. 238 A second consequence is a gradual shift in the ways in which
consumers prefer to experience copyrighted works, from a preference
for ownership to a preference for "convenience." If, say, rental com-
panies like Blockbuster and Nefflix are the delivery mechanisms of
variety, but a dulling, repetitive sameness as works include over and over the same
elements intended to cater to popular tastes.").
231 See Stadler, supra note 184, at 923-24.
232 Yochai Benkler has defined "users" as those "individuals who are sometimes
consumers, sometimes producers, and who are substantially more engaged partici-
pants, both in defining the terms of their productive activity and in defining what they
consume and how they consume it." Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards
a Political Economy of Information, 52 DuKE L.J. 1245, 1268 (2003).
233 See Stadler, supra note 184, at 923.
234 See id. at 924.
235 See supra notes 23, 146 and accompanying text.
236 See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 110, 111, 114, 116, 118, 119, 122 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
237 See Stadler, supra note 184, at 949-54.
238 Cf Dana Gioia, The Impoverishment of American Culture, WALL ST. J., July 19,
2007, at D7, available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/la/?id=1 10010352 (discuss-
ing the decline of culture and education in America as the focus of society has shifted
away from arts and sciences towards a culture based purely on entertainment).
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today, then many in the industry hope that "on demand" services will
be the mechanisms of tomorrow. 239 A consumer simply would contact
a subscription service to request and watch a movie through streaming
video technology. That technology would leave the consumer with no
need to store a tangible copy-but it also would prevent her from
watching the movie again without paying another fee. Once technol-
ogy permits, songs could be streamed in the same way. ("Pay per lis-
ten," perhaps.)
Unfortunately, this convenience would come at the expense of
freedoms that consumers once took for granted. One such freedom is
the ability to experience a work unlimited times. In the music indus-
try, rightsholders have partnered with technology companies to con-
vince consumers to purchase music that can only be used in specified
ways. Apple, for example, openly places a number of technology con-
trols on songs purchased through its popular iTunes service, includ-
ing limits on the number of times consumers can burn a song to
physical media, even after purchasing it.240 Another such freedom is
the ability to use copyrighted works to engage in the cultural conversa-
tion. People can interact more readily with tangible copies; digital
signals, encrypted and streamed over a network, are there one second
and gone the next. And then there is the question of privacy: in a
"pay per" world, a corporation necessarily would be monitoring each
use on the way to exacting payment for it. Sony-both a rightsholder
and a technology company-recently experimented with compact
discs containing "spyware," thus enabling Sony to gather information,
in secret, from customers when they played those discs with their own
computers. 241 So far, consumers have reacted to efforts like these
with varying degrees of outrage,242 suggesting that, for the time being,
at least some percentage of the public values the ability to enjoy physi-
cal possession of copyrighted works. But for copyright owners who
have the patience to wait, this is the promise of the performance right:
239 See Randall Stross, Pass the Popcorn. But Where's the Movie?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2007, § 3, at 3. But see id. (noting the "preternatural[ ] suspicio[n]" of the movie
studios, who wish to "be certain that DVD sales are not hurt by immediate availability
of video-on-demand" before releasing their content to the format).
240 See Apple Inc., I-Tunes Store Terms of Service, http://www.apple.com/legal/
itunes/us/service.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
241 See Ted Bridis, Sony to Suspend Making Anti-Piracy CDs, WASH. POST, Nov. 11,
2005.
242 See Dan Mitchell, The Rootkit of All Evi N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2005, at C5 (criti-
cizing Sony); Randall Stross, Want an iPhone? Beware the iHandcuffs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2007, § 3, at 3 (criticizing Apple).
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in time, its use promises to make consumers accept their dependence
on the content industry for each and every copyrighted experience.
These cultural changes are a direct result of the way in which
Congress has shaped the copyright law and, within it, the exclusive
right to public performance. This means, in turn, that the only way to
reverse these changes is to amend the law. While it may seem pater-
nalistic to force consumers to sacrifice the "convenience" of evanes-
cence, the Constitution charges Congress with legislating "'to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good' "243 -not only
in the short term, but in the long term as well. In the long term, it
simply does not make sense to create a society in which the public
enjoys nothing more than the right to rent an inventory of copy-
righted works from a handful of media conglomerates.
In Part III, I propose two ways in which Congress might craft a
new performance right, in each case describing a right that is consid-
erably more narrow than the one that exists today. The first proposal
withholds the performance right entirely from most owners of copy-
right, thus sacrificing breadth for clarity. The second proposal
defines the right more broadly by extending a more limited right to
more beneficiaries, but because those limitations might be susceptible
of varying interpretations-e.g., the "for profit" limitation-the sec-
ond proposal sacrifices clarity for breadth. Despite their differences,
both proposals satisfy a handful of requirements: First, any new per-
formance right should strike a "balance of competing claims upon the
public interest"244 by granting rights sufficient to encourage people to
publish, in tangible copies, the raw materials of performances, but
withholding rights when encouragement is unnecessary. At the same
time, the law should encourage performers to perform-or at least
should not discourage them from doing so. Second, the public
should have the opportunity to interact with tangible copies of per-
formable works, and to do so at a reasonable cost. Because part of
keeping costs "reasonable" is minimizing the cost of copyright clear-
ance, any new right should be defined so as to avoid entangling users
in a web of overlapping rights and multiple payments. Finally, the
public should have the opportunity to interact with tangible copies of
performable works at no cost, for at least some purposes, even if copy-
243 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 245 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)); accord Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
244 Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156; see also id. ("Creative work is to be encouraged and
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.").
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right owners would prefer to charge for access. 245 This means, in
turn, that at least some performances should be private or otherwise
beyond the reach of the law. My proposals follow.
III. FINDING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE EXCLUsIvE RIGHT TO PERFORM
A performance right that "balance [d] ... competing claims upon
the public interest" 246 would grant only that entitlement necessary to
encourage people to create and publish the raw materials of perform-
ances. Is the foregoing web of overlapping rights and royalties neces-
sary, in this sense? It does not answer the question to observe that
creators now expect to enjoy these rights and royalties, and therefore
that the law must continue to satisfy them. As I have argued else-
where, the fact that creators expect to continue to enjoy an existing
entitlement does not mean they have a right to expect it.24 7 Copy-
right law does not exist to satisfy expectations of increasing reward,
but to benefit the public at large by "promot[ing] the Progress of Sci-
ence."248 This benefit is best achieved by asking not what rights cre-
ators have come to expect, but what rights creators are entitled to
expect given the nature of the public interest in copyright. When it
comes to the performance right, have creators formed reasonable
expectations of reward? In answering this question, Congress might
craft a new performance right in several ways. In this Part, I discuss
two of those: First, Congress might withhold the performance right
entirely from most owners of copyright, thus creating a significantly
narrower right than the existing one. Second, and probably more pal-
atably to most, Congress might define a performance right that
extends to existing beneficiaries, but that is subject to a host of limita-
tions. I consider these options in turn.
A. Clarity at the Expense of Breadth
1. Musical Works
Consider, first, the case of musical works: today, most people
acquire the ability to hear a particular song either by purchasing a
compact disc or by downloading a computer file (with or without per-
245 See Stadler, supra note 184, at 926.
246 Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156.
247 See Stadler, supra note 9, at 438-39, 473-77.
248 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting to Congress the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
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mission) .249 As both compact discs and computer files are "copies"
under § 101 of the Copyright Act,25 0 copyright law should safeguard
incentives to create by providing songwriters with at least the ability to
demand payment when others vend copies of performances of their
songs, either in physical or electronic form. In other words, it seems
reasonable, at least, to provide songwriters (and their assigns) with the
exclusive right to distribute copies of their works under § 106(3)-the
right now served by the mechanical license. 251
At present, however, songwriters also expect the ability to
demand payment when others either perform their works or deliver
those performances to new audiences. 25 2 Is such an expectation rea-
sonable? Surprisingly, the answer may be "no." If most people
express their desire to hear songs repeatedly by acquiring copies of
those songs, then the performance right is duplicative as to those peo-
ple, which is another way of saying that songwriters would get paid-
through sales of copies-with or without the exclusive right of public
performance. Of course, granting songwriters the performance right
would pay them more, but higher payments to songwriters mean
higher costs to society. If Congress were serious about balancing these
marginal costs against the marginal benefits that a duplicative right
provides songwriters, Congress might reasonably withhold the per-
formance right entirely where the publication right alone (i.e., the
right to distribute a work in copies) is sufficient to induce creation.2 53
249 But see infra Part III.B (discussing the emergence of technologies capable of
streaming copyrighted works "on demand").
250 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "copies" as "material objects ...
in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device").
251 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 115 (2005) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007) (stating that for "non-
dramatic musical works, the exclusive rights provided by clauses (1) and (3) of section
106 .. .are subject to compulsory licensing under the conditions specified by this
section").
252 See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
253 Alternatively, Congress could take its cue from Justice Brandeis in Buck v. Jew-
ell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931), and create an implied license to perform.
See id. at 199 n.5 ("If the copyrighted composition had been [originally] broadcast...
with plaintiffs' consent, a license for its commercial reception and distribution by the
hotel company might possibly have been implied." (citing Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d
734 (S.D. Cal. 1929))). That is, after granting songwriters the performance right,
Congress could limit that right to provide that anyone who owned an authorized copy
of a song would be entitled to perform that song in public. The display right, in
§ 106(5), already comes with a limitation like this. In the words of § 109(c):
[T]he owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this title, or any per-
son authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copy-
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This arguably is true in the case of songwriters, who achieved the
greatest of their victories not by acquiring the performance right in
1897, but by convincing Congress, in 1909, to define "copies" so as to
include the sorts of artifacts through which music overwhelmingly is
experienced today.254
If songwriters did not enjoy the exclusive right to perform their
works publicly, then radio stations could play songs without securing a
performance license. Yet songwriters hardly would go unpaid. Radio
stations would have to acquire copies of the songs they play, for which
copies songwriters would receive compensation (from record compa-
nies) under the terms of negotiated or mechanical licenses. If, at pre-
sent, negotiated licenses are drafted so as to deny royalties to the vast
majority of songwriters, 255 then one would expect songwriters to
right owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection
of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at the place where
the copy is located.
17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2000). The wording of the limitation is technical, but the idea
behind it makes perfect sense to ordinary people: having bought a copy of a "display-
able" work like a painting, the owner has the right to display that copy in at least some
ways. In copyright terms, the purchase of a copy includes the equivalent of an
implied license to display it. If those who purchased authorized copies of perform-
able works had the right to perform those works in public, then many of the overlap-
ping rights in the web simply would disappear.
Unfortunately, when it comes to music, at least, writing such a limitation into the
statute might do more harm than simply eliminating the performance right entirely.
In a world in which, perversely, many rightsholders are eager to keep physical copies
of their works out of the hands of consumers, the law should not give rightsholders
any encouragement to avoid distributing their works in tangible form. If the statute
were to provide songwriters with a performance right only as against people who
lacked an authorized copy, then songwriters might do what they could to prevent
people from obtaining authorized copies-thus enabling songwriters to rely solely on
the performance right for compensation. Again, whither physical copies? See supra
Part II.
254 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (overruling
White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) and granting owners
of copyright in musical works the exclusive ight to "make any arrangement ... of
[their works] in any system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of
an author may be recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced"), repealed
ly Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Star. 2541.
255 In correspondence, Michael Carroll has informed me that songwriters rarely
receive royalties from record sales because under standard recording contracts,
record companies must recoup their costs before disbursing any royalties on sales of
compact discs, and roughly 90% of albums made do not record enough sales to per-
mit the disbursement of royalties. (Thus, songwriters are accepting lesser royalties
than the ones to which they are entitled under the mechanical license.) This means,
in turn, that performance royalties may be the primary source of income for most
songwriters. This may be particularly true for composers of hit songs, but according
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demand more favorable terms, knowing that their incomes flowed
from the sales of compact discs, not from radio play. Songwriters may
lack bargaining power to accomplish this result today, but a repeal of
the mechanical license would go a long way toward remedying that
imbalance. 25 6 To be sure, songwriters might receive less compensa-
tion than they do now, simply because one purchase of a compact disc
enables repeated performances of the songs on that disc. But those
performances would continue to benefit songwriters in other ways.
The practice of payola,257 for example, suggests that those in the
recording industry view radio play as a significant promotional tool,
and no wonder: listeners hear a new song on the radio, and if they like
it, they purchase a copy. Sales of copies flow directly from favorable
experiences. This is the secret behind such services as the Internet
radio station Pandora, which encourages listeners to "Listen to Free
Internet Radio, Find New Music." 2 58
Some listeners, of course, might choose to acquire unlicensed
copies of performed songs-as when, for example, one records a song
during an Internet radio broadcast. For people like these, the per-
formance right might not be duplicative of the publication right, and
indeed, the performance itself might threaten the sale of copies.
Even in the nineteenth century, courts perceived this threat; as one
court observed, in Keene, a copyright owner should be able to prevent
"a reporter from noting the words of [his] play phonographically or
stenographically or otherwise." 259 So far as songs are concerned, how-
ever, this threat is overstated. First, it is harder than it sounds to make
unauthorized copies of performances that rival authorized copies in
terms of quality. Quality recordings of live performances are few, and
to Carroll, even minor songwriters attach a symbolic significance to performance roy-
alties, which "should not be overlooked in the incentive calculus." Of course, if song-
writers knew that the publication fight was the primary source of their incomes, then
they likely would demand more favorable terms. Further, it may not make sense for
society to incur the costs of the performance right simply because songwriters find it
significant as a symbol of their worth.
256 Indeed, it seems reasonable to make that license voluntary, as opposed to com-
pulsory, for a single company likely could not control the market for published copies
of songs today (as was the case in 1909). See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see
also Loren, supra note 6, at 709-11 (proposing to eliminate the compulsory mechani-
cal license as part of a broader solution to the problems posed by copyright law as it
applies to music).
257 See Lorne Manly, How Payola Went Corporate, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, § 4, at 1
(defining "payola" as "the illegal trading of secret payments in exchange for airplay"
and describing modern incarnations of the practice).
258 See Pandora Radio, http://www.pandora.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
259 Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180, 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7644).
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on the radio, disc jockeys regularly talk over portions of the songs they
broadcast, making those songs less appealing as archival copies. Sec-
ond, the guy who saves a song from Internet radio to his computer so
he can hear that song again is distinguishable from the "reporter" in
Keene the radio listener is making a personal copy, while the reporter
is making a copy for the purposes of engaging in a public perform-
ance of his own (if not a public distribution). As I have argued else-
where, the benefits of personal copying, standing alone, likely
outweigh any harm to copyright owners in the form of lost reve-
nues.260 (Mark Lemley has termed these lost revenues "uncompen-
sated positive externalities," and has argued, persuasively, that
intellectual property law should seek to promote them, not eradicate
them.261)
If anything, the argument for giving the performance right to
songwriters is even less compelling when it comes to the use of songs
in movies and television programs. If songwriters did not enjoy the
exclusive right of public performance, then producers could include
songs in their films without securing the performance portion of a
synchronization license. Again, however, songwriters would not go
unpaid. First, songwriters would receive royalties for the use of their
songs on soundtracks, which are sold in the form of compact discs.
Second, songwriters whose songs were synchronized to film would
enjoy a right to payment each time a movie or television program was
distributed in copies under § 106(3).262 Copies of the most popular
movies and television programs are routinely sold in retail stores, so
this compensation could be significant. The promotional value of
having a song included in a popular film is significant as well.
If the publication right (and the market) arguably are providing
plenty of incentive for songwriters to create and license recorded per-
formances, then what about live performances? In creating the per-
formance right, Congress was mindful of performances "in... concert
halls, theaters, restaurants, and cabarets," 263 so one might expect Con-
gress to grant songwriters at least the exclusive right to performances
in those venues. As technology has changed, however, so have the
260 See Stadler, supra note 184, at 946-49, 952-54, 957-58.
261 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv.
1031, 1052 (2005) ("[P]art of the point of intellectual property law is to promote
uncompensated positive externalities, by ensuring that ideas and works that might
otherwise be kept secret are widely disseminated.").
262 Those payments would not be governed by mechanical licenses, which are lim-
ited to "nondramatic musical works." See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (1) (2000).
263 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 60-2222 (1909)).
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ways in which people experience music. Before the public had access
to machines like the phonograph (and technologies like radio), music
reached the public primarily through live performance in public
spaces. Today, people are much more likely to enjoy recorded music,
either by listening to recordings of their own or by listening to record-
ings owned by broadcast services like radio. Thus, unlike in 1897,
most people who listen to music today can trace their experiences to
tangible copies, the distribution of which is reserved to copyright own-
ers under § 106(3)-again, making the performance right duplica-
tive. This is not to say that live performances are not unique; they are.
But if the public values live performances more than recorded ones,
that increased value is created almost entirely by performers who,
being present with their audiences, are able to create an intimacy that
recordings lack. Moreover, as with radio, sales of copies flow directly
from favorable experiences-including those experiences involving
live performances.
2. Audiovisual Works
Given the ways in which movies and television programs are dis-
tributed, many of the foregoing arguments apply to audiovisual works
as well. Movies, like songs, increasingly are enjoyed in private (as
indeed television always has been), and increasingly, people experi-
ence both movies and television programs by purchasing or renting a
copy, whether physical or digital. 264 Thus, if Congress were to with-
hold the performance right from owners of copyright in audiovisual
works, those owners would not go unpaid. In some ways, of course,
this payment is less certain than it is in the case of musical works: both
movies and television programs are characterized by a higher ratio of
personal experiences to purchased copies than are songs. Movies, for
one, can be (and often are) experienced in public spaces, enabling
the owner of a cinema to use one copy of a film to reach thousands of
paying customers. Through the magic of transmission, television sta-
tions can use one copy of a program to reach millions more. Unlike
songwriters, however, owners of copyright in movies and television
programs have recourse to market mechanisms that make it possible
to earn an adequate reward by exercising the publication right alone.
One of those mechanisms is price discrimination, by which right-
sholders could charge varying prices to cinemas, television networks,
and video stores to reflect the varying numbers of experiences they
264 See, e.g., Edward Jay Epstein, Gross Misunderstanding: Forget About the Box Office,
SLATE, May 16, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2118819/ (noting that "home
entertainment provided 82 percent of... [studios'] 2003 revenues").
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enable. While producers almost never can discriminate among pur-
chasers without experiencing some leakage, the mechanism likely
would function reasonably well in the markets for audiovisual works.
There are several reasons for this. First, most of the works in this cate-
gory enjoy relatively short lives. Most people who experience movies
in cinemas, at least, wish to see "first run" movies, which linger in dis-
tribution for only a few weeks or months. Most television shows have
similarly short runs (except for the chosen few, which live on in syndi-
cation). Knowing this, a movie producer who wishes to engage in dis-
criminatory pricing can release her work to cinemas (charging a
higher price per copy), then wait a few months to release her work to
video stores (charging a lower price per copy). Second, because those
copies exist in technologically distinct media, price discrimination as
between those media is likely to be more effective. Cinema owners,
for example, rent copies of movies stored either on photographic film
stock or, more recently, entire hard drives. Neither format is likely to
be of much interest to ordinary consumers, who purchase or rent cop-
ies of movies on more portable video discs. Finally, the movie and
television industries are highly concentrated, which means that pro-
ducers and purchasers are likely to engage in repeated exchanges with
one another. The terms of those exchanges are dictated to a large
extent by industry custom. Few networks would air "aftermarket" tele-
vision programs, purchased on the cheap, if to do so would mean
alienating the very studios that might produce the next blockbuster.
Of course, many television shows, in particular, are not sold to
the public in tangible form, suggesting that owners of copyright in
those shows do not profit by distributing copies of their works to the
public. The works in this category, however, might be the very works
for which the inducement of copyright is unnecessary. Newscasts, talk
shows, and televised awards ceremonies probably should be included
here: each is designed either to provide information (which is unpro-
tectible) or to provide the most fleeting of entertainment for which
there is no lasting demand. One suspects that such works would con-
tinue to exist if there were no performance right, and indeed, if there
were no copyright protection at all. And if this is true, then granting
an exclusive right here would burden society without providing a cor-
responding benefit.
3. Dramatic Works
When it comes to dramatic works, the foregoing arguments are
not nearly so persuasive. Unlike songs, plays primarily are exper-
ienced in person, at least outside the classroom. As a consequence,
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people express their preference for plays not by buying copies of
them, but by attending ephemeral performances of them in public
spaces (or by watching recordings of those performances on televi-
sion). This difference is significant. If Congress were to withhold the
performance right from playwrights, then playwrights would get paid
solely by exercising the distribution right in 106(3)-that is, by pub-
lishing copies in return for money. One producer who bought a copy
of Glengary Glen Ross could stage that play for thousands of paying
guests, who likely would not go on to purchase copies of the play for
themselves. The ratio of personal experiences to purchased copies
would have exploded, and with it, perhaps, the incentive of play-
wrights to spend their days writing plays. And unlike owners of copy-
right in audiovisual works, playwrights would not find price
discrimination to be nearly so effective a tool.
In theory, at least, if owners of copyright in dramatic works knew
that their rights under copyright law would end with the publication
of copies, then they would price those copies accordingly, depending
on the intensity of the uses that purchasers proposed to make. For
playwrights, however, pricing access per copy poses challenges that
pricing per performance does not. First, plays have much longer shelf
lives than movies and television programs do. Theatergoers are as
likely to buy tickets for old plays as new ones; a play released on
Broadway in 1984265 can be the subject of a freshman English course
in 1994, only to be revived on Broadway in 2004. Second, plays tend
to exist in a single (and affordable) format-i.e., paper-which means
that a theater owner can stage a play with a used book bought in a
college bookstore for $2.99. Without the performance right, these
market realities would make it difficult, if not impossible, for some-
body like David Mamet to keep theater owners from staging Glengary
Glen Ross using aftermarket copies purchased on the cheap. Under
the first sale doctrine, 266 the first distribution of each authorized copy
(to the book publisher) 267 would extinguish any claim of exclusivity
265 Glengarry Glen Ross, by David Mamet, was released on Broadway on March 25,
1984. Carol Lawson, Mamet's New Play About Real Estate to Open in March, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 1984, at C2. It went on to win the Pulitzer Prize that year. Samuel G. Freed-
man, The Cast That Put Mamet on the Board, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1984, at C21.
266 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) (outlining the respective rights of copyright own-
ers and owners of subsequent copies).
267 The sale to the textbook publisher likely would qualify as a distribution
because: (a) there is substantial identity between the concepts of "distribution" and
"publication"; and (b) § 101 defines "publication" as either (1) "the distribution of
copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending"; or (2) "It]he offering to distribute copies or pho-
norecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public perform-
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over those who succeeded to ownership of those copies-even for
$2.99.
One response to the foregoing challenges is simply to require the
playwright to charge the right price the first time. For those who
engage in the distribution of copies, this is a familiar obligation and,
insofar as the public is concerned, a salutary one: in enacting the first
sale doctrine, Congress clearly believed that the benefits of encourag-
ing competition in secondary markets (like used bookstores)
exceeded any costs flowing from threats to inducement-including
the cost of having to charge the right price the first time.2 68 With
plays, though, the risk of mispricing is far greater than it is with songs,
for example, simply because the ratio of personal experiences to pur-
chased copies is higher. The higher this ratio, the harder it is to calcu-
late and demand a high enough price per copy to justify the sale that
extinguishes the publication right. As a consequence, it might not
make sense to require playwrights to bear the risk of mispricing copies
of their works if, as I suspect, that risk is great enough to significandy
impair the incentive of playwrights to write plays. In other words, so
far as playwrights are concerned, the societal benefits of the perform-
ance right might, on balance, exceed its costs.
How, then, might Congress achieve this first solution, in which
rights are narrowly but clearly defined? It simply would amend
§ 106(4) to provide that "the owner of copyright.., has the exclusive
right[ ] . . . in the case of dramatic works, to perform the copyrighted
ance, or public display." Id. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "publication"); see also
supra note 26 (discussing the meaning of "publication"). A playwright who sells her
play to a textbook publisher certainly is "offering to distribute copies or phonorecords
to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution." See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
268 Consider the following exchange:
Mr. Walker. According to this bill as you understand it, would it be compe-
tent for an author to print under his copyright notice a reservation prohibit-
ing people from doing anything with that book except reading it
themselves? Would it be competent for the author to prohibit the sale of
that book by the purchaser?
Mr. Steuart. Yes, sir .... [U] nder the absolute right of the author, he could
make any reservation he pleased. In other words, this so-called sale would be
nothing but a license to read.
Mr. Mckinney. May I ask a question, Mr. Steuart? Was it the object of the
draftsmen of this bill to break up the second-hand book business?
Mr. Steuart. Not at all.
Arguments on S. 6330 and HR. 19853, supra note 74, at 164 (statements of William M.
McKinney, Arthur Steuart, and Albert H. Walker).
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work publicly. ' 269 For good measure, Congress might choose to throw
in "choreographic works" and "pantomimes," which resemble dra-
matic works in almost every respect. As for owners of copyright in
"musical . . . and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, 2 70
however, they would be left to exercise those exclusive rights found
elsewhere in § 106.
B. Breadth at the Expense of Clarity
While withholding the performance right from most copyright
owners might seem radical to some, it arguably would benefit society,
at least in a world in which tangible copies "continue to play an impor-
tant role." 27 1 As we have seen, however, technology is in the process
of enabling the widespread use of "on demand" services for which the
provision and retention of copies is beside the point. What if, in the
future, broadcasters could buy libraries of compact discs and stream
songs, on demand, to customers with handheld wireless devices capa-
ble of sending and receiving digital signals? For customers, those
devices would be like iPods without hard drives, playing songs without
storing copies of them. Customers simply would create "play lists" that
their devices would use to request the streaming of music from broad-
casters, song by song. If songwriters did not enjoy the exclusive right
of public performance, broadcasters who used such technology would
not be guilty of infringement because they would not be engaging in
public distribution under § 106(3)-that is, they would not be ena-
bling (or even offering to enable) the transfer of copies.2 72 If uses like
this one were lawful, might they threaten the inducement of creation
on which copyright law depends?
The answer is an unsatisfying "maybe." If enough of the public
developed a preference for subscription services over the purchase of
physical copies, then the publication right in § 106(3) might decrease
in value enough to significantly diminish the incentives of songwriters
and others to create. Arguably, this shift in preferences is much more
likely to occur with the support of rightsholders than without it. A
269 Cf 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (granting the right to owners of
copyright in "literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works").
270 Id.
271 See Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 1025, 1061 (1998) ("Books and other information in physical form,
however, continue to play an important role."); see also F. Gregory Lastowka, Free
Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 293, 300 (2001)
(noting that this was the case "in the past").
272 See supra note 267.
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century ago, copyright owners were slow to react to changes in tech-
nology, but today, copyright owners are much more adept at using
technological change to secure greater rights for themselves. 273
Secure in the existing performance right in § 106(4), rightsholders in
the movie industry, for example, are actively investing in the technolo-
gies necessary to enable "on demand" services, knowing that they will
reap the benefits of that investment.274 If Congress were to advance
the public interest in copyright by withholding the performance right,
then rightsholders might not be so eager to invest. Indeed, if most
rightsholders got paid only by distributing copies of their works, then
one would expect them to embrace the idea of the tangible copy, not
to enable technologies that promise to make tangible copies increas-
ingly rare.
There are, however, other, less radical ways in which Congress
could encourage people both to create performable works and to
publish those works in tangible copies. One obvious solution is to
extend the performance right in § 106(4) to most of its existing bene-
ficiaries, 275 but to limit that right so as not to undermine incentives to
exploit the publication right in § 106(3). In crafting those limitations,
Congress also could pursue other worthy goals, such as placing per-
formances that seem "less" public beyond the reach of the law,
thereby reducing the number of exactions per work performed-and
thereby giving the public more of an opportunity to interact with per-
formable works. As it happens, there is precedent for such an
approach; it resides in the history of the performance right itself.
Consider, first, the place analysis in the first half of the definition
of "publicly" in § 101: as we have seen, Congress created the perform-
ance right intending to capture only those performances "in such
public places as concert halls, theaters, restaurants, and cabarets." 276
273 See generally Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV.
278, 343-57 (2004) (examining the interaction between copyright holders and
advances in technology).
274 See Stross, supra note 239 ("For the studios, digital delivery of a rental elimi-
nates the problem of a physical product being resold, cutting into the sales of new
copies without generating additional royalties. And studios are paid every time an on-
demand video is viewed.").
275 If, as I have written elsewhere, "most authors write books so that others might
pay to read them," it is unreasonable for owners of copyright in literary works to
expect the right to exclude others from performing those works, making it unneces-
sary to include those copyright owners among the beneficiaries of § 106(4). See Stad-
ler, supra note 184, at 937. Computer programs, which also qualify as "literary works,"
are beyond the scope of this Article.
276 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975); see also
H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 4 (1909) (stating that section (d) of the Copyright Act of
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Under existing law, by contrast, a public place is either "a place open
to the public or ... any place where a substantial number of persons
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is
gathered."277 A performer can violate the exclusive right of public
performance either by performing a copyrighted work in such a place
or by "transmit[ting] or otherwise communicat[ing] a performance"
to such a place.278 The result is an unnecessarily broad conception of
place-capturing everything from Carnegie Hall to a chicken shack.
If Congress wished to narrow this conception, it simply could return
to "the paradigm image of a public performance[:] an actor [singer,
dancer, etc.] seen and heard by an audience assembled in his immedi-
ate presence. '2 79 A play would be performed publicly, for example,
only when actors played it before a live audience, i.e., in the physical
presence of an audience assembled in a place (like a theater) that was
open to the public.
To accomplish this result, Congress likely would have to tinker
with the definition of "perform," making clear that to perform a work
means to sing, play, act, or dance it directly-not "by means of any
device or process," 280 such as a movie projector or computer. (This
would have obvious implications for proprietors of audiovisual works.)
Congress also would have to amend the definition of "publicly," pro-
viding that to perform a copyrighted work "publicly" is "to perform...
it at a place open to the public in which both performer and audience
are physically present." Under these definitions, a singer in Carnegie
Hall would have to license the right to perform the songs in her reper-
toire, but the proprietor of a tiny chicken restaurant who wished to
play the radio for the benefit of his patrons would neither be "per-
forming" songs nor doing so "publicly," and therefore would not need
a license. Songwriters and playwrights would get paid when their
works were performed live in the most public of venues, but not when
performances of their works were delivered to more private venues via
technologies like radio, television, and the Internet. To capture the
value in later deliveries of performances, songwriters, playwrights, and
movie and television producers would have to exploit the publication
1909 was "intended to give adequate protection to the proprietor of a dramatic work"
whose "compensation comes solely from public representation of the work").
277 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "publicly").
278 Id.
279 United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 876 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1967) (citing Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411
(6th Cir. 1925)), rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
280 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "perform").
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right by distributing tangible copies of performances to the public.
And why not? Most people enjoy songs, movies, and television shows
in private, and to the extent people wish to enjoy those works repeat-
edly, they do so by acquiring copies of them. Plays, however, are
mostly enjoyed in public spaces before live audiences, thus giving play-
wrights the need for protection in the form of an exclusive right to
public performance.
The problem with this proposal, of course, is that the foregoing
amendments would not address the challenges posed by "on demand"
services that in the future might supplant the distribution of copies, at
least in some industries. To meet those challenges, Congress would
have to turn to the transmission analysis in the second half of the defi-
nition of "publicly" in § 101. Under existing law, that definition is
extremely broad, covering any acts that
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance ... of the work
to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of
receiving the performance .. .receive it in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times. 28 1
The addition of the words "or to the public" gives copyright owners
the ability to reach into private venues, regardless of whether the
transmission competes with their own systems of distribution or,
indeed, with anything they happen to be selling.
If Congress wished the performance right to reach only competi-
tive transmissions, it could return to the sort of limitation that an ear-
lier Congress imposed on songwriters in 1909, confining the right to
public performances "for profit. '282 Given the expansive definition
courts have given to those words over the years, 283 however, Congress
281 Id.
282 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
283 Few phrases in copyright history have been construed more expansively than
the phrase "for profit." One might expect those words to include only those acts by
which a third party trades performances of copyrighted works for payment, as when a
subscription service provides access to a library of performable works for a monthly
fee. Yet courts consistently have construed the term more broadly. In Herbert v. Shan-
ley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917), the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a hotel
and a restaurant had performed musical works for profit when they engaged musi-
cians to play those works for patrons, live, "without charge for admission to hear
[them]." Id. at 593. While Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, acknowledged that
"the music is not the sole object," he added, "neither is the food, which probably
could be got cheaper elsewhere." Id. at 595. The music, he noted, was "part of a total
for which the public pays," that total being "a repast in surroundings that to people
having limited powers of conversation, or disliking the rival noise, give a luxurious
pleasure not to be had from eating a silent meal." Id. at 594-95. In a flourish of
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likely would have to choose another phrase: according to the
Supreme Court in Herbert v. Shanley Co.,2 84 the "for profit" limitation is
satisfied merely if an enterprise earns a profit from any source; the
transmission itself need not be the source of that profit.2 5 Because
almost every transmission is made for the purpose of achieving either
"direct payment for the performance ... or indirect payment ... or a
general commercial advantage . . . [in the] expectation and hope of
making profits through the sale of [other] products [or services],"288
radio stations, hotels, restaurants, stores, and even bloggers would be
held to have violated the exclusive right to transmit any copyrighted
works for profit-for like YouTube, each one benefits in some finan-
cial way, as bloggers do when they trade advertising space for money.
The clearest way for Congress to avoid this result would be to amend
§ 106(4) itself, giving existing beneficiaries "the exclusive right[ ] ...
to perform the copyrighted work publicly and to transmit any peform-
ance of the work to the public in exchange for payment."28 7 To be sure, both
"in exchange" and "payment" are capable of varying interpretations in
the courts. Even so, Congress could guide interpretation by clarifying
that the transmission right includes only the right to exclude what
courts in the past have termed "direct payment for
performance." 28 8
In sum, I have proposed two changes to the performance right:
one, giving copyright owners the right to exclude only those perform-
ances in truly public places in which "both performer and audience
stunning breadth, Justice Holmes concluded, "If music did not pay, it would be given
up.... [But w]hether it pays or not, the purpose of employing it is profit and that is
enough." Id. at 595. Under this construction of "for profit," only performances by
"eleemosynary" actors managed to escape the reach of the statute. Id. at 594; see also
Jerome H. Remick & Co., 5 F.2d at 412 ("[1]t is against a commercial, as distinguished
from a purely philanthropic, public use . . . [that] the statute is directed."); M.
Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 779 (D.N.J. 1923) (holding a
department store to have performed musical works for profit when it played the radio
in its stores; observing that "[a] department store is conducted for profit, which leads
us to the very significant fact that the cost of the broadcasting was charged against the
general expenses of the business").
284 242 U.S. 591.
285 Id. at 595; see supra note 283.
286 Jerome H. Remick & Co., 5 F.2d at 412.
287 This change to § 106(4) would render unnecessary the second half of the
existing definition of "publicly" in § 101, because a transmission necessarily requires
the use of a "device or process," and it necessarily contemplates a public whose mem-
bers "receive [the transmission] in the same place or in separate places and at the
same time or at different times." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining
"publicly").
288 See Jerome H. Remick & Co., 5 F.2d at 412.
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are physically present"; and two, giving copyright owners the right to
exclude only those transmissions in which others deliver perform-
ances in return for payment. While this right would not be as broad
as the one in existing § 106(4), the proposal would strike a "balance
of competing claims upon the public interest,"289 and it would achieve
this balance in several ways: First, the proposal would grant a quantum
of exclusivity that gives a leading role to the publication right in
§ 106(3), thus encouraging copyright owners to distribute their works
in tangible form. Second, it would give the performance right a sup-
porting role in cases in which withholding that right might threaten
the inducement to create performable works in the first place. Third,
this structure would sweep away much of the web of overlapping rights
that so characterizes copyright law today. And fourth, in placing some
performances (and deliveries of performances) beyond the reach of
the law, it would give the public more of an opportunity to interact
with performable works at no cost-including, perhaps, by becoming
creators or even performers themselves.
C. What About Performers?
Since 1972, performers (or their assigns) have enjoyed the right
to prevent others from reproducing and distributing works known as
"sound recordings" in copies that "directly or indirectly recapture[ ]
the actual sounds fixed in the recording."290 Since 1996, owners of
copyright in sound recordings also have enjoyed the exclusive right to
"perform [those works] publicly by means of a digital audio transmis-
sion."291 In recent years, however, many scholars have argued that
these rights are too narrow-that like owners of copyright in "literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works,"292 rightsholders in
289 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also id.
("Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ulti-
mately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and
the other arts.").
290 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1 (a), 85 Stat. 391, 391 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2000)); see also id. § 3, 85 Stat. at 392 (providing
protection for works fixed on or after February 15, 1972). Owners of copyright in
sound recordings also enjoy the exclusive right to "prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work," subject to the same limitation. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(2),
114(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2004).
291 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
39, §§ 2-3, 109 Stat. 336, 336-37 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114(d)
(2000)); see also id. § 6, 109 Stat. at 349 (providing for an effective date of February 1,
1996).
292 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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sound recordings deserve the performance right in § 106(4), too.293
Are they right?
If the performance right imposes costs on performers for the
benefit of rightsholders in the precursors to performance, then elimi-
nating or limiting the performance right would reduce those costs,
thus providing performers with more encouragement to engage in
performances. Regardless, scholars might believe that performers
"deserve" to enjoy the performance right themselves, but for utilitari-
ans, at least, claims of desert are beside the point, except to the extent
any deserved rewards "serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts."29 4 That is, per-
formers "deserve" rights under copyright law only insofar as those
rights are necessary to induce performers to create "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 29 5 What
sorts of inducement do performers require? Like the other characters
in this story, performers likely engage in recorded performances so
that they might deliver those performances to the public in return for
money. They also engage in live performances, for which they likely
expect to charge admission. The question, of course, is whether it is
reasonable for performers to expect copyright law to provide those
inducements.
Of recorded and live performances, live performances present
the easier case. Copyright only subsists in works that exist in tangible
form, 29 6 and as a consequence, while it may seem perfectly reasonable
to grant performers exclusive rights in their live performances, copy-
right law cannot be the source of that grant. This does not mean that
live performers go unpaid. Performers regularly engage in live per-
formances, in return for money, and they do so because other laws
stand in the breach: the law of trespass enables performers to exclude
freeloaders from performance venues, and the "anti-bootlegging" pro-
visions in § 1101 of Title 17 give performers a remedy against those
who "fix," copy, and distribute "the . . .sounds and images of a live
musical performance in a copy or phonorecord" without permis-
sion.2 97 If Congress wished to strengthen the protections that per-
formers enjoy in their live performances, thus providing a "liberal
293 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
294 See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156 (citing H.R. RrP. No. 60-2222, at 4 (1909)).
295 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.
296 See id.
297 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000).
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encouragement," 298 then it could expand the coverage of § 1101 to
include any unauthorized fixation or publication of a live perform-
ance, musical or not.
Recorded performances-i.e., those fixed "by or under the
authority of the author"299 -present the harder case. On the one
hand, the relative infancy of copyright protection for sound record-
ings arguably is evidence that no copyright protection is necessary, for
American performers have been performing without that protection
for hundreds of years. Then again, in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, performances were ephemeral, for there was no technology
with which to record them-much less "print[ ], reprint[ ], pub-
lish[ ], and vend[ ]"300 copies of them. Songwriters, by contrast, have
used printing technology to vend copies of their songs (in the form of
sheet music) since Congress extended protection to musical works in
1831.301
Given this sea change in technology, it might indeed be reasona-
ble for performers to expect copyright law to provide them with some
reward when copies of their performances change hands. The anal-
ogy to songwriters is particularly instructive here: while the first half of
the definition of "sound recordings" is phrased broadly, the second
half makes clear that the phrase is intended to refer primarily to the
recorded performances of songs. 302 And as with songs, most people
acquire the ability to hear a musical performance by acquiring a physi-
cal or electronic copy of it. Given this reality, Congress might reasona-
bly seek to encourage performances by providing owners of copyright
in sound recordings with the ability to prevent others from distribut-
ing copies of those performances, either in physical or electronic
form. Because the goal is to protect the expression contained in the
performance-not the song-it also makes sense to limit the publica-
298 Cf Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (May 2, 1807), in 11 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 200, 201-02 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) ("Cer-
tainly an inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his invention for a
certain time .... Nobody wishes more than I do that ingenuity should receive a
liberal encouragement.").
299 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 2005) (defining "fixed").
300 See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436; Copyright Act of 1790, ch.
15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
301 See § 1, 4 Stat. at 436 (extending grant to owners of copyright in musical
works).
302 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "sound recordings" as "works that result from the
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are
embodied").
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tion right to "the actual sounds fixed in the recording."30 3 Congress
already has done both of these things, granting the reproduction and
distribution rights in § 106(1) and (3) and limiting those rights in
§ 114(b).
Just because it is reasonable for performers to expect compensa-
tion in return for delivering performances, however, does not mean
that Congress is bound to satisfy that expectation by granting the per-
formance right. To the contrary, it should do so only if the publication
right is insufficient to induce performers to perform. This clearly is
not the case. To date, Congress has chosen not to extend the per-
formance right (in § 106(4)) to sound recordings; 30 4 as the Senate
observed in 1995, "[sound recording copyright owners] were not
granted the right of public performance, on the presumption that the
granted rights [under section (1), (2), and (3)] would suffice to pro-
tect against record piracy."30 5 Notwithstanding this gap in protection,
thousands of performers continue to engage in (and record) perform-
ances. Again, extending the performance right to those in the music
industry would enable them to earn more, but it is hard to argue that
those higher payments would represent anything more than a wealth
transfer to people who obviously would create in any event.
The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995306 is a perfect illustration of what happens when rightsholders
convince Congress to ask what society can pay instead of asking
whether society should have to pay in the first place. For right-
sholders, securing the digital performance right was simply a question
of deserved reward-or, according to the Senate Report in support of
the legislation, a question of fairness and 'justice." Quoting Marybeth
Peters, the Register of Copyrights, the Committee reported that
"'U]ustice requires that performers and producers of sound record-
ings be accorded a public performance right.' ,,307 After all, other cop-
yright owners enjoy the performance right; why should owners of
sound recordings be left in the cold?308 In enacting the legislation,
303 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2000).
304 See id.
305 S. REP. No. 104-128, at 10 (1995), reprinted in, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 357.
306 Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.).
307 S. REP. No. 104-128, at 13 (quoting The Performance Rights in Sound Recordings
Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 227 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 43 (1996)
[hereinafter Hearing on S. 227] (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights
and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services)).
308 See id. (stating the belief of the Senate that "'the time has come to bring pro-
tection for performers and producers of sound recordings into line with the protec-
tion afforded to the creators of other works"' (quoting Hearing on S. 227, supra note
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Congress also may have been persuaded to benefit the analog radio
industry, which sought protection against competition from digital
radio stations. 309 Either way, the results have been predictable:
SoundExchange, an organization that represents rightsholders in
sound recordings, persuaded the Copyright Royalty Board not only to
increase statutory royalty rates by more than 100% by 2010, but also to
require Internet radio stations to pay a $500 administrative fee for
each channel they offer-a "major problem for large Internet radio
sites, such as Pandora, Live365 and Yahoo Inc., which offer thousands
of channels. '310 The Board also eliminated caps on royalties for small
Internet radio stations, some of which already have closed their doors
because '"they would owe much more in royalties than their stations
earn."311 Thus has the digital performance right begun to produce
what Yochai Benkler has termed the "commercialization, concentra-
tion, and homogenization of information production."312 Nor are
these costs remotely outweighed by the benefits of the legislation,
which are enjoyed by a privileged few.
This legislative victory has emboldened rightsholders in sound
recordings to demand the performance right in § 106(4), for per-
formers (like songwriters) now feel entitled to performance royalties
even from those who purchase authorized copies. According to the
Senate, the "digital transmission of sound recordings is likely to
become a very important outlet for the performance of recorded
307, at 31 (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks))); supra note 9.
309 See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 13 ("Notwithstanding the views of the Copyright
Office and the Patent and Trademark Office . . . the Committee has sought to
address the concerns of record producers and performers regarding the effects that
new digital technology and distribution systems might have on their core business
without upsetting the longstanding business and contractual relationships among
record producers and performers, music composers and publishers and broadcasters
that have served all of these industries well for decades.").
310 Jim Puzzanghera, Internet Music Stations Receive a Reprieve, L.A. TIMES, July 17,
2007, at C2; accord Kendra Marr, Webcasters'Fates Still Uncertain, WASH. POST, July 17,
2007, at D2.
311 Puzzanghera, supra note 310.
312 See Benkler, supra note 229, at 93 ("The differential effects of increases in intel-
lectual property protection on divergent strategies suggest that such increases lead to
commercialization, concentration, and homogenization of information production."
(footnote omitted)); see also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture:
Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 142 (Lucie
Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006) ("[T]he greater cultural standardization
likely to occur under conditions of pervasive commodification is cause for substantial
concern." (citing Benkler, supra note 229, at 81-99)).
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music in the near future"3 13 -and copyright owners feel they should
be the ones to control it. As with songwriters, however, the evidence
suggests that at present, performers find adequate protection in the
publication right in § 106(3), which means that Congress should not
be so quick to relinquish control over such an "important outlet
for .. .performance."3 14 In the end, it is a question of the public
interest in copyright: musical performances worth distributing in tan-
gible copies deserve legal protection; and society may reasonably
decline to spend its resources enabling performers to charge for
access to the rest.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have sought to determine whether the exclusive
right of public performance has "serve[d] the cause of promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts"31 5 as
well as it has satisfied the needs and wants of copyright owners.
Viewed in the light of its history, the right is interesting, even strange:
First, the right does not protect performers (or their performances),
but instead creates exclusive rights in the precursors to performance
such as plays and songs-thereby giving playwrights, songwriters, and
others the ability to subject performers to demands for payment. Sec-
ond, notwithstanding the wording of the right, the right reaches pri-
vate acts along with public ones, for lawmakers have defined "publicly"
to include a host of behaviors that begin and end in private spaces.
Third, the definition of "performances" includes not only paradig-
matic performances in public spaces like concert halls, but it also
includes electronic transmissions, which definition, in turn, enables
copyright owners to profit from the delivery of their works at "each
step in the process by which a protected work wends its way to its audi-
ence."3 16 In this respect, the performance right is not really about
performances at all. Instead, copyright owners are using the right to
avoid the statutory limitations on the publication right (i.e., the right
to distribute a work in copies), under which copyright owners can
313 S. REP. No. 104-128, at 14.
314 Indeed, if Congress were to take any action, that action should be limited to
giving owners of copyright in sound recordings the right to exclude only (1) those
performances in truly public places in which "both performer and audience are physi-
cally present"; and (2) those transmissions in which others deliver performances in
return for payment. See supra Part III.B.
315 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 60-2222, at 4 (1909)).
316 David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
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profit only from the first sale of each tangible copy. In short, the
exclusive right of public performance has become a powerful tool in
the hands of copyright owners, who are using it to control how the
public acquires and experiences copyrighted works.
This tool imposes significant costs on society. Among the more
quantifiable of these are the costs of complying with the right, includ-
ing the time and money spent in clearing rights and the money spent
in payment of royalties. Other, less quantifiable costs may be even
more significant, among them the scarcity of tangible copies that
results when copyright owners seek to maximize their profits by pro-
viding the public with ephemeral experiences instead of works in
physical form. Against these costs, the societal benefits of the existing
right are surprisingly few. So far as musical works are concerned,
most people express their desire to hear songs repeatedly by acquiring
copies of those songs and playing them in private. Because songwrit-
ers (like all copyright owners) enjoy the exclusive right to public dis-
tribution, songwriters already have the right to demand adequate
compensation under copyright law-even without the performance
right. The same is true of audiovisual works, for many of the same
reasons. Only dramatic works continue to reach audiences primarily
through ephemeral performances in public places, and so, for play-
wrights, at least, the exclusive right to distribute their plays in copies
might not provide enough of an inducement to create. That is, only
for playwrights might the performance right be truly necessary.
If Congress were to withhold or limit the exclusive right of public
performance, then rightsholders in the music, movie, and television
industries would face a number of changes, the greatest of which
would be a shift in philosophy: no longer would the law encourage
rightsholders to deliver their works using technologies that leave the
public with no tangible copies-and no ability to experience those
works again without paying another fee. Instead, the law would
encourage the proliferation of tangible copies, which ordinary people
could use to perform copyrighted works in public without fear of lia-
bility. Those performances, in turn, might encourage the creation of
yet more "original works of authorship," fixed in yet more "tangible
[media] ,"317 which not only would benefit copyright owners but also
would "serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of litera-
ture, music, and the other arts. '3 18
A change in the law would work other changes as well. So far as
the music industry is concerned, the greatest of these changes might
317 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
318 Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156.
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be the near obsolescence of organizations like ASCAP and
SoundExchange, which exist solely to demand and collect perform-
ance royalties from the public on behalf of their clients-right-
sholders in musical works and sound recordings, respectively. In the
face of any threat to their existence, these organizations are likely to
make a great deal of noise, and with good reason: any change to
existing entitlements under copyright law would disturb the expecta-
tions of copyright owners, whose demands for greater reward have
been satisfied with each new piece of copyright legislation. But this is
no reason for Congress not to act. As I have argued elsewhere,
respecting the expectations of existing rightsholders by maintaining
the status quo would require Congress to sit on its hands indefi-
nitely,319 or, as Yochai Benkler put it, to "lock an economy into sub-
optimal arrangements. '" 320 To be sure, changes may produce winners
and losers, making those changes "redistributive," but the use of this
loaded term simply begs the question whether rightsholders were enti-
tled to their existing rewards in the first place.321 The importance of
that question is far greater than any changes to a single organization
or even to a single industry. If rightsholders are not entitled to expect
the rewards that the law now provides, then now is the time to confine
a right that is beginning to transform society for the worse.
319 See Stadler, supra note 9, at 475-76.
320 See Benkler, supra note 229, at 98-99 (" [T]hese adverse effects may be difficult
to reverse.... [Tihe process begun by a change in law may be path determining, and
may lock an economy into sub-optimal arrangements indefinitely.").
321 SeeJulie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management, "97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 511 (1998) ("Redistribution cannot be defined
with reference to initial entitlements, and it is nearly always the scope of those entitle-
ments that is contested.").
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